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certain national security administrative reforms,
such as fixing Saigon's chain of command problems
and centralizing all intelligence and security
activities within the office of the president. 5
CD) The D.S. ambassador to Saigon, Eldridge
Durbrow, agreed with some of these measures,
but pushed for deeper political, psychological,
and economic reforms, arguing that Diem needed
to broaden his popular support and offer a program
to counter communist inroads with the
rural population."
fSt However, the problem was simply that
Diem would not allow the needed reforms.!
~ Wben Durbrow tried to convince Diem of
the need to reform, the Vietnamese president
simply brushed aside the recommendations as
too difficult to implement in the face of VC activities."
Even trying to influence Diem by threatening
to cut off aid, or simply criticizing him, would
be tricky and could cause him to be less cooperative.1
CD) As usually happened in Vietnam, events
forced the hands of the participants. In this case,
the November 1960 attempted coup by dissident
paratroops of the South Vietnamese army (See
Chapter 2, pages 66-67.) solidified Diem's resistance
to reform. Now, more than ever, he refused
to delegate political authority outside his immediate
coterie of family members. Moreover, the
opportunity for a creditable Vietnamese, noncommunist
opposition had virtually disappeared.
Ambassador Durbrow, who had grown less sanguine
about Diem's chances, was recalled to
Washington."
CD) Before he was recalled, though, Durbrow
cabled the draft of the finished counterinsurgency
plan.to Washington in early January 1961. The
plan was really a restatement of the Okinawa
study. It called for the expansion of Saigon's military
and paramilitary forces. In return, Saigon
was urged to implement certain administrative
changes to its national security apparatus, as well
as institute a programofcivil action." Little heed
was given to forcing anyfundarnental changes to
Diem's political and economic policies.
CD) Shortly after he was inaugurated,
President Kennedy received more badnews from
Vietnam. Edward Lansdale, CIA operative and
savior of Diem in the critical days of 1955,handed
the president the report of his trip to Vietnam
from early in January. Kennedy read through it
and remarked afterwards, "You know, this is the
worst one we've got, isn't it You know
Eisenhower never uttered the word Vietnam." 13
Ten days after his inauguration.T'resideritJohri
F. Kennedy approved the counterinsurgency plan
as the basic framework for supporting Saigon's
struggle.
CD) Although not all the provisions of the plan
were realized, its emphasis on a military solution,
to both South Vietnam's external and internal
threats, was an important indicator of the future
nature of America's commitment to the struggle
in Saigon. To an important degree, the plan's rec-
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