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a role that the Swatows filled all during the next
few days' action.t"
(S//SI) The T-146 patrol craft also ordered
the other craft to turn on its "equipment," which
probably referred to its Skin Head radar.
However, the Maddox did not intercept any emissions
from the Swatow's radar. The North
Vietnamese boats referred to the track as the
"enemy"; the equation of the term to the Maddox
was made by Phu Bai. 41
(8//8I) Shortly after 2300G (1600Z) on 1
August, the naval intercept site in the Philippines
reported that the DRV naval base at Ben Thuy
(18"39'1'1, 105"42'E) had informed an unidentified
entity, possibly the T-146 patrol boat, that it had
been "DECIDED TO FIGHT THE ENEMY
TONIGHT [1 Group unreadable] WHEN YOU
RECENE DIRECTING ORDERS." The base also
queried the boat if it had received the "enemy's"
position change from another naval entity, possibly
an authority on Hon Matt Island (18"48'N,
lOS" 56'E).4 2
The Maddox was informed of this
intercept. A half hour after receiving the most
recent report, Captain Herrick informed Seventh
Fleet and CINCPAC that he had terminated the
Desoto mission because of indications of an
imminent attack and was now heading east out of
the patrol area at ten knots. These indications of
an attack were from Vietnamese communications
intercepted by the two field sites, as well as
the NSG detachment aboard the Maddox.
Throughout the rest of the day, these stations
would monitor the North Vietnamese ship-toship
and ship-to-shore manual morse and voice
communications nets. They intercepted the allimportant
vectoring information, the orders from
shore commands, and all the tactical communications.
However, the DRV boats made no hostile
moves against the Maddox that day.
(J//JI) Throughout the night of 1/2 August,
according to the intercepted communist messages,
the North Vietnamese continued to track
the destroyer as it remained east of Hon Me
Island, some twenty-five miles offshore. Still,
nothing had happened that night, and so the
Maddox returned to its patrol line off the DRV
coast on 2 August.
(S//8I) During the early morning, the
Maddox, which was heading along the northern
track of its patrol area, was notified of further
North Vietnamese tracking of its movements. The
North Vietnamese naval motor torpedo boat
squadron stationed at Port Wallut command was
receiving the tracking. A coastal surveillance
radar station on Hon Me may have been ordered
to begin tracking the destroyer "continuously." (It
is possible that this station had been inactive during
the previous day so as to deny any information
on its operation parameters from the
American monitoring effort.j'"
(rS//SI) More ominously for the Maddox, the
communists also had ordered P-4 patrol torpedo
boats (MTB) and Swatow-class patrol boats to
begin concentrating near Hon Me Island later in
the morning.t" These patrol torpedo boats had
been supplied by the Soviet Union. The P-4 boat
displaced twenty-five tons. Its top speed was fifty
knots; its cruising speed was thirty knots. It had
two twin 12.7-mm machine-gun mounts and two
eighteen-inch torpedo tubes. The P-4 boat also
carried a Skin Head surface search radar. The
reporting from the American intercept sites construed
the Vietnamese boat concentration near
Hon Me as a prelude to an attack on the
Maddox. 45
(8//SI) NSA feared that an attack on the
Maddox was in the offing. At 1002G (0302Z) on
2 August, NSA sent an urgent message to a number
of commands and sites in the region warning
of a possible attack. Included in this message was
CINCPACFLT, MA.CV, and the Commander, 7th
Fleet. Ironically, the Maddox was not on distribution
for this message; the DSU would have
received the message, but it was not addressed
either. The gist of the message was simple:
repeated attacks by "enemy vessels" on Hon Me
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