spartans_in_darkness

'FOP SE6REli','SOMlffFlHE:1
radar.i" The tracking continued through the
afternoon into early evening. The Haiphong naval
authority and the Swatow boats near Hon Me
exchanged position information on the two
destroyers as they moved from the north to south
and back north on their patrol." At one point,
another Siuatoio, T-379, erroneously identified as
an SO-l class subchaser, was ordered to go out
and observe "different targets," which probably
referred to the American ships." The North
Vietnamese also detected aircraft in the area of
the Desoto patrol, though it is unclear from their
report whose aircraft these were. However, the
commander, 7th Fleet, had ordered a continuous
combat air patrol accompanying the two destroyers.
The navy jets flew their cover to the east of
the Desoto position so as to avoid infringing on
DRV air space. 77
(9;'/9I) By early evening, Haiphong ordered
T-142 to track the Desoto patrol. T-379, which
earlier had been instructed to observe the Desoto
patrol, had sailed to Hon Ngu Island (IS"4S'N,
105"47'E). It had arrived at 2250G (1550Z) and
reported that the situation at sea was "peaceful.,,78
~T-142 took up a position to the north of the
two destroyers and stayed with them, reporting
the location of the American ships to Haiphong
either directly to naval HQs or relaying reports
through T-146. Both u.S. ships reported being
followed from the north at a distance of thirtyeight
miles by a DRV patrol craft using its Skin
Head radar. By this time, 2252G (1552Z), the
Desoto patrol was heading southeast out of the
patrol area as had been instructed earlier."
Tracking of the destroyers ended soon after when
they were out of range.
(S//SI) Meanwhile, the main concern of the
DRV navy was the recovery operation for the
boats damaged during the 2 August attack. Late
in the night of 3 August, Haiphong informed T­
142 that the salvage tug Bach Dang would soon
leave Haiphong (it was not clear from the intercept
if the time of departure was OlOOG, 4
August/1S00Z, 3 August) and head towards Hon
Me Island to tow T-333 and T-336 back to
Haiphong or Port Wallut, which was their unit's
base. 80 It was expected that the tug would arrive
at about noon on 4 August. Meanwhile, T-146 was
ordered to stay with the two damaged boats from
Squadron 135 and report their position and status.
(U) So ended 3 August. That evening's 34A
raid on Vinh Son was protested by Hanoi. In its
complaint, it accused the two destroyers of participating
in the raid. Although the DRV's mVI1
tracking of the two ships had ceased some hours
before, and they could not be certain of where the
American ships were, the Vietnamese had
inferred anyway that the Desoto ships were
involved. It may not have been the right conclusion,
but the Vietnamese believed it. Washington
still did not think that Hanoi would attack again.
(U) Round 2: "Everything in Doubt"­
The 4 August Action
(S//SI) At o6ooG (2300Z) on the morning of
August 4, the two destroyers turned westward
towards the DRV coastline to begin their day's
patrol. By 1300G (0600Z) they returned to their
duty station off the coast of North Vietnam near
Thanh Hoa (20"OS'N, 105"30'E), known as point
"Delta," where they began to steam to the southwest
along the Vietnamese coast. The air cover
from the Ticonderoga again was overhead and to
the east. An hour later, the Maddox reported that
it had another shadow, this time fifteen miles to
the east. The identity of this shadow cannot be
determined.
(S//Sn The North Vietnamese had been
tracking the Americans. Haiphong informed T­
142 at 1610G (091OZ) that they had located the
destroyers near 19"36'N and 106"19'Etraveling on
a southwest heading. However, this last position
of the two ships had been acquired by the North
Vietnamese some two and one-half hours earlier
TOP SESRETII60MUm,'X4 Page 195