spartans_in_darkness

EO
1. 4. (c)
They could then adjust any planned 34A operation.
The navy accepted these reassurances from
MACV. 14
(S//SI) The first Desoto mission in the Tonkin
Gulf region ran from February to March 1964.
The USS Craig (DD-885) sailed near Hainan
Island towards the Vietnamese coast and then
turned back north towards Macao and Taiwan.
"-----------' The North Vietnamese
tracked the Craig as it swung south of Hainan
Island, but had made no reaction even though
they knew that it was a U.S. warship. It was
uncertain to the Americans what the Vietnamese
Dreciselv knew of the Craia or its mission.!
I
(S//81) During this mISSIOn, there was a
Naval Security Group DSU aboard whose task
was to provide tactical intelligence to the Craig's
commander, as well as intercept unique communications
and electronic intelligence in reaction to
the vessel's presence. The Craig also received
support from the SIGINT facilities in the region:
the navy and air force COMINT sites in the
Phili ines
"--- ---INo Vietnam-based sites were
involved since the area of Craig's mission barely
touched on the DRV's territorial waters, and then
only briefly, although it was suspected that the
North Vietnamese navy at least once did report
the Craig's position."
(D) However, there were two critical differences
between the Craig's Desoto mission and
that of the Maddox which followed it in late July
and August: \ The Maddox would sail along the
entire DRV coastline, while, at the same time,
OPLAN-34A maritime missions against North
Vietnamese coastal installations were being carried
out. By July, the North Vietnamese were
reacting aggressively to these raids, pursuing and
attacking the seaborne commando units.
(TS//SI) In mid-July 1964, the JCS approved
another Desoto mission, which would concentrate
on collecring vintelligence on North
Vietnam's coastal defense posture. The USS
Maddox, under the command of Commander
Herbert Ogier, loaded up its intercept van in the
I
IThe sixteen members
of the DSU boarded, and the ship departed for the
Gulf of Tonkin. The Maddox had received no
additional instructions to its standard collection
mission and apparently was not aware of specific
OPLAN 34A missions in the area." However,the
Maddox was not on a purely passive mission. U,S.
intercept sites in the area were alerted to the real
reason for the Desoto missions, which was to
stimulate and record North Vietnamese
"--- .....reactions in support of the
U.S. SIGINT effort.l"
(TS//SI) CINCPAC's orders to Herrick were
equally as explicit and ambitious: locate and
identify all coastal radar transmitters, note all
navigational aids along the DRV's coastline, and
monitor the Vietnamese junk fleet for a possible
connection to DRVjViet Cong maritime supply
and infiltration routes."" Whether these missions
could be completed was questionable: the DSU
was limited by its few positions and equipment in
collecting such a large amount of communications.
The Maddox had been ordered by CINC­
PAC to stay eight nautical miles from the North
Vietnamese coastline, but only four miles from
any of its islands." It would be attacks on these
islands, especially Hon Me, by South Vietnamese
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