spartans_in_darkness

19P SE6RE'FM69MINlIJ*1
1. 4. (c)
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('J'B//SI) Were the communists on to something
There is no doubt that they were correct in
their.assessment of Washington's disenchantment
with Diem's failure to adopt a course of
political and social reform and then stick to it.
Whether or not the VC were correct in believing
that the Americans were contacting dissident
Vietnamese politicians and generals to facilitate a
coup against Diem is not so clear. The American
attitude towards Diem was always ambivalent;
since 1961, Kennedy administration officials
remained divided over support for Diem. But
there is no evidence that the U.S. instigated any
coups against Diem. Washington did not have to
do anything. The Vietnamese officers and politicians
were proficient enough at devising coup
plans of their own,
CU) There were contacts between CLo\ agents
and their Vietnamese counterparts: some CIA
operatives, such as Lucius Conein, had a long
record of operations within Indochina and were
friendly with a number of Vietnamese general
officers. Also, there were several thousand
American military and civilian advisors in South
Vietnam at this time; many of them were attached
to the newly started counterinsurgency and chic
action programs. But, there is no real evidence
• that they were influencing their hosts against
Diem. It would not be until late 1963, when the
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