spartans_in_darkness

EO 1.4. (c)
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(8//81) A large number of the reports by the
various field sites and NSA were issued contemporaneously
with the events themselves. A few of
these would be cited in the various after-action
analyses and postmortems that attended the Gulf
of Tonkin. However, many more field translations
and reports based on the intercept during
the period of the incidents would be issued as late
as two to four days after the crisis. The reason for
the apparent delay was that the request from NSA
for ALL intercept came only on 7 August.i"
(C//81) Because of the nature and enormous
amount of the SIGINT evidence used here for the
very first time in discussing the Gulf of Tonkin
crisis, we will need to present it in a format which
will highlight that information. Rather than try to
retell the story all at once and incorporate the new
evidence into the narrative, which could be overwhelming,
especially to those readers not intimately
familiar with the events of 2 to 4 August,
a different tack will be used. We will break down
the events into their separate days. First, we will
review the details of the known engagement of
the afternoon of 2 August. While there is no controversy
surrounding this fight - at least there
is no question that it occurred - there is an
important point to draw from it: that is, the
North Vietnamese communications profile during
a naval combat engagement was revealed. For
ease of reference, we shall refer to this communications
profile as the "command and control
communications and intelligence" system or C3I.
This is a functional description used widely in the
intelligence and defense communities to describe
the process whereby the individual elements of
intelligence (information/intelligence), command
and control (interaction by command
authorities), and communications (communications
links among all operating elements and
units) are combined in military operations.
CD) After looking at the "uneventful" day of 3
August, we will consider the "official" version of
the engagement of 4 August. Although, as we
progress through the narrative, we will consider
the problems with the various other pieces of evidence
which support the contention that an
attack occurred, the emphasis will be on the SIG­
INT "clinchers," that is, those reports that convinced
the Johnson administration that an attack
had occurred. These items will be presented when
and how they appeared to the participants.
(C) Finally, we will go back over the clinching
SIGINT "evidence" of 4 August and illustrate
what problems exist with the individual pieces.
In this section, the entire scenario of what was
reported and, more importantly, what was not
reported, will be considered. We will review
closely the technical problems with the two critical
SIGINT reports which prop up all of the other
evidence of an attack by the North Vietnamese. In
this approach we will consider how the product
was developed and the serious problems in translation,
composition, and reporting of the information.
(C//8!) One last item. For purposes of clarity,
all time references will be marked either Zulu
time ("Z," or Greenwich Mean Time) or Golf ("G,"
or Zulu +7), which is the time zone for the Gulf of
Tonkin. While the actual time of the incidents
was in local, or Golf time, SIGINT reports were
issued in Zulu time. This is done because of the
worldwide nature of SIGINT reporting. The use of
Zulu time allows for a consistent and universal
benchmark for analysts and recipients of the
intelligence. To further confuse the issue, the U.S.
Navy used Hotel time (Zulu +8) in all of its messages,
which is carried over into its history of the
Vietnam War. Then there are the events in
Washington, D.C., and NSA HQ, Fort Meade,
MD, which are in the Eastern time zone, or
Romeo ("R," or Zulu-5 hours). The latter times
will be notated "EDT" for Eastern Daylight Time.
(The U.S. was on Daylight Savings Time, which
advanced clocks in Washington one hour.) All
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