spartans_in_darkness

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U.S. intelligence community: Just what was
known about Tet and when would it occur Yet
the answers to the simple interrogatives of "what"
and "when" were disputed heavily in the post-Tet
assessments. As we shall see, the "what" of Tet
was known, but in a variety of guises. The all
important knowledge of when Tet would hit was
just as significant as the nature of the attack. But
the knowledge of the "when" was studded with
nettles of uncertainty as welL Intelligence derives
most of its special justification by supplying commanders
with that certain foreknowledge of
enemy intentions and capabilities. "Forewarned
is forearmed" is the time-honored cliche from
warfare. For the intelligence community, and the
cryptologic one is included here, the controversy
surrounding Tet would seriously call into question
its methods of providing timely and useful
warning to the American command.
CD) Some judgments of the intelligence effort
prior to Tet have been harsh. A West Point textbook
compared the intelligence failure ofTet with
those of Pearl Harbor and the Second Ardennes
Offensive in December 1944. 1
Former Secretary
of Defense Clark Clifford, who replaced Robert
MeNamara, insisted that not one word of warning
had been received by General Westmoreland or
the American ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth
Bunker." Claims to the contrary have been made
by participants and observers. One of the most
knowledgeable participants at the time suggests
that there was no strategic surprise, but that several
tactical aspects of the offensive were a surprise
to the command in Saigon and the Johnson
administration in Washington."
('f5//51) From the cryptologic perspective,
resolving the controversy about the "what" and
"when" of pre-Tet SIGINT reporting will not be
easy. This is so for a number of reasons. For one,
various assertions have been put forward in official
reports, and by some former cryptologists
who might be considered to have direct knowledge,
that SIGINT did indeed "predict" when the
Tet attacks were to occur. One NSA senior did
claim that SIGINT reporting went down to the
wire, that it "went out hours before the attack,
and told when, where, how, and locations, and
timing." 4 Other NSA analysts, veterans of the
war, also made similar claims for SIGINT predicting
the Tet attacks." Similar refrains of this
chorus can be found in other histories and assessments
of the SIGINT community's performance.
An unclassified CIA history concluded that,
except for the National Security Agency, no other
elements in the intelligence community did better
than provide a "muted warning." 6 The same history
added:
The National Security Agency stood alone in
issuing the kinds of warning-, the U.S.
Intelligence Communitv was designed to provide,
The first SIGIl\T indicators of impending
major activity began to appear in the second
week of .Ianuarv 19611. In the following davs
:-JSA issued a number of alerts, culminating in a
major warning it disseminated widelv in communications
intelligence channels on 25
.Ianuarv, titled 'Coordinated Vietnamese
Communist Offensive Evidenced in South
Vietnam'. 7
o.GA
CD) Even public histories of Tet have echoed
this assessment. One stated that the NSAanalysis
of communist communications "confronted
MACV analysts and officers with indications that
attacks throughout South Vietnam were imminent.
At least six days before the offensive, the
NSA provided a specific and accurate warning of
when the offensive would materialize and an
accurate prediction about the location of the
attacks." 9
(5//51) Yet there exists a large body of analyses,
reports, and histories which heavily criticize
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