spartans_in_darkness

"F8P SESRHIfS8MIIHN*1
EO 1.4. (c)
was already carrying the brunt of the cryptologic
load in Vietnam. Another potential difficulty was
that the JSA threatened to swallow up the already
thin layer of available target expertise from the
• • 107
mtercept sites.
Laurence H. Frost, traveled throughout the Far
East on a tour of sites and supported commands.
He attempted to enlist either CINCPAC (Admiral
Felt) or COMUSMACV (General Harkins) to take
operational control of the SIGINT units in the
region, but both demurred, preferring that the
units Improve their performance rather than
reorganize their structure.!"
(TS//Sn In the end, the road taken reflected a
desire to please all of the participants, Rather
than name a central authority for all SIGIDIT
activities in Southeast.Asia, a compromise/was
reached in which jiufhority was divided up
amongst the principals, The commander USASA
was appointed: executive agent for second echelon
reporting on all communist communications in
the region with the Philippines site acting as the
senior reporting center. The Philippines also
absorbed first echelon reporting responsibilities
from all the sites subordinate to it. The ASAcommander
also was to be the host service for all colocated
SIGINT facilities in the region.I
...
OGA
~Ultimately, this solution never solved the
lingering need for centralized control, while, at
the same time, the experience with the JSA plan
left many military commanders suspicious of the
desire by NSA to control all SIGINT resources in
the region. The struggle for control of SIGINT
assets would continue throughout the war and
1....- ...... surface again in 1970 when the JCS would try to
(TS//Sn The trouble was that no one seemed
to want the responsibility of running the entire
SIGINT program in Southeast Asia. In April and
May, the incumbent DIRNSA, Vice Admiral
redefine the doctrine and mission of certain tactical
SIGINT assets to get them away from NSA's
control.113
"F8P SE€RETHeOMINli'f*1 Page 145