spartans_in_darkness

EO
1. 4. (c)
Teli SEeRETNeeMIN1iVlE:1
CU) For the next year, the Kennedy administration
supported the Phouma faction, and tried
to convince Phoumi to join the coalition with his
opponent. Phoumi resisted both Washington's
blandishments of economic and political help or
the billy clubs ofthreatened sanctions. However,
Kennedy did not want to push
the Laotian leader too hard.
Then Phoumi committed a mistake
which nearly provoked
another intervention crisis for
the United States.
CHI ~\;
the Gulf of Siam. A battalion of US. Marines was
airlifted to Udorn, Thailand, to joina Marine air
contingent already there. NSA reacted by issuing
another SIGINT Readiness BRAVO andputting
all the sites in the region, including the year-old
ASAfacility at Ton Son Nhut Airbase, outside of
Saigon, on alert.!
A
CU) In early 1962, Phoumi
began a buildup in the isolated
town of Nam Tha in the remote
northwest province of Louang
Namtha, near the border with
the PRe. What exactly Phoumi
wanted to accomplish is unclear.
The town was far from any
strategically important area and
was difficult to supply or reinforce.
Perhaps, he hoped that a
battle there would precipitate
U.S. intervention. Whatever his
intentions, on 6 May North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
troops attacked Nam Tha and
drove the 4,500 RLA defenders
from it.
'11l\IL\~f)
(TS//SI) Fearing another
general offensive that could
overrun the rest of Laos, the U.S.
quickly organized a contingency
force, Joint Task Force 116CJTF­
116), composed of ships of the
Seventh Fleet which sailed into
~ Laos ilnd territory controlled by Pathet 1..40 and the nattonaltsts, 1962
Tep SEeRETHeeMIN1i\'lE:1 Page 93