spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SEeREli't'eOMINfN)(1
have been based on very thin evidence, it concurrently
was demonstrated that the Johnson
administration had indulged in a very selective
use of information. Ifthe administration had not
lied exactly, it had not been exactly honest with
the public, or, for that matter, even honest within
its own deliberations. The question no longer was
about the appropriateness of the resolution, but
the basic honesty of the administration. It would
cast a pall on an already distrusted Johnson presidency.
As Senator Barry Goldwater, who had run
against .Johnson in the 1964 presidential election,
bitterly noted years later in 1972, "I had no reason
to believe that Mr. Johnson's account of the gravity
existing in the Gulf of Tonkin was not legitimate."
197
*
*
CU) In this chapter we have done something
quite apart from most Agency histories: Using
virtually hitherto untouched material from a variety
of sources, we have told a radically different
version of an important event in cryptologic history
which, in turn, had a critical effect on the
course of American history. In doing so, a great
deal of unfamiliar ground, in terms of source
material, had to be covered, and the new information
could not be presented in a typical, historical
narrative format. Instead, we had to
painstakingly analyze a series of documents
which were quite important if we were to grasp
what happened on 4 August 1964. Admittedly,
this was a difficult task, but it was necessary if we
were to be as comprehensive as possible in our
analysis of what happened.
*
*
CU) After recounting all of the events and analyzing
the sources, the remaining task for the historian
is to attempt to characterize them, to offer
a summation or a judgment that will place the
narrative into a coherent framework. But before
that can be done, it is necessary to review what
has been presented. In this way we can consider
again what we have learned about the events in
early August.
(V) A Douqlas A-4 Skyhqwk qttqck plane
catapults from q carrier in the Gulfof Tonkin
quring attack operations in August 1964.
CU) As for the Tonkin Gulf incident itself,
President Johnson summed it up best just a few
days later: "Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were
just shooting at flying fish."
(8//81) We have seen that the Gulf of Tonkin
incidents occurred as a result of the congruence
of the Desoto patrols and the maritime commando
raids along the North Vietnamese coast carried
out under OPlAN 34A. In the period leading
up to the Maddox mission, the DRV had been
reacting with increasing force to the OPlAN 34A
attacks. Monitoring Hanoi's more aggressive
response to the raids, NSAhad warned the major
commands in the region of the potential danger
for the Desoto patrols, but the warning did not
register. The decision makers in Washington
believed that Hanoi would not see the two missions
as related.
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