spartans_in_darkness

optimized to make use of the tactical and technical
advantages it had: a faster jet in the MiG-21,
complete GCI surveillance and control, and the
isolated nature of the large formations the
Americans employed.
(S//SI) What was even more disconcerting to
the Americans was that the North Vietnamese
were able to carry out the attacks despite the presence
of the QRC-248 and the Rivet Top systems;
somehow they were able to devise techniques that
negated the technical warning systems which had
just been installed by the Air Force that summer.
Furthermore, the attacks suggested that the
Vietnamese understood the technical limits of the
American radar and SIGINT systems. Later, it
would be revealed that U.S. intelligence, mainly
SIGINT, had observed the new Vietnamese tactics
for some time before the attack, perhaps as
early as April 1967. 63 It should be mentioned,
though, the SIGINT elements had monitored a
number of new tactics being tested by the North
Vietnamese and probably did not know which
onets) Hanoi was going to settle on. Still, 7th Air
Force commanders were angry at this news/"
CU) To counter the enhanced MiG threat,
the Air Force tried a number of things. It moved
the EC-121 orbit in closer to the Vietnamese
border, thus extending radar coverage to Route
Packages V and VI.
The College Eye
flights were given
control of the U.S.
fighters flying the
MiG combat air
patrol CMiGCAP).
The platform
could now direct
the MiGCAP based
solely on the
returns from the
QRC-248. Finally,
the White House
allowed air strikes
on the jet airfield
at Phuc Yen. (Gia Lam, because it also was an
international airport, was still off limits.) All of
these tactics restored some advantage to the
American position. In October, twenty MiGs were
de-strayed, twelve on the ground, but only two
were MiG-21s. Many of the remaining MiGs dispersed
to China.
CU) Still, de-spite all of these more aggressive
tactics, the hit-and-run tactics by the MiG-21s
continued to hurt the Americans. Before August
1967, the U.S. Air Force was downing MiG-21s at
a rate of 6 to 1. From August 1967 to the end of
February 1968, the MiG-21 was shooting down
Air Force jets at a rate of better than 3 to 1. The
U.S. Navy had broken even on the MiG-21s,
shooting down two while losing two F-4s, but the
Navy had expended forty-two air-to-air missiles
to rack up the two kills!65
CU) In early 1968, events on the ground
diverted the Air Force and Navy air missions
away from Rolling Thunder. The siege of the
marines at Khe Sanh caused the services to shift
to ground support of that garrison. The Tet offensive
at the end of January diverted further air
resources. A last effort at attacking targets in the
north was stymied due to the usual bad weather
at that time of the year. Most importantly, on 1
April 1968 President Johnson ordered a halt to all
(V) President Johnson, on 31 Mi.ltch 1968,appeared on natlonwide TV to announce
termination ofi.ltti.lcks north ofthe 19th parallel.
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