spartans_in_darkness

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TOP S~e~~TiIeeMINTfflE1
~ Departing from two major terminals in
the DRV, the supplies and men moved mostly by
truck through two potential bottlenecks. The first
was west along Route #8 through the Nape Pass
from Vinh Linh, which turned south to the
1....- ---' Laotian crossroads town of Mahaxai. From there,
(TS//Sij Movement from the DRV to the
south was accomplished by a variety of methods.
Most troops moved by foot on roads westward
towards the Laotian border. Others headed south
to cross the DMZ. In the early years, both directions
were taken. This duality reflected the early
concern by Hanoi that use of Laotian (and
Cambodian) territory would necessarily be limited
to the movement of small groups because of
the uncertainty of an available, sustaining supply
capability. The southern route seemed more conducive
to infiltrating large numbers of men. 4 8 At
the same time, the southern route obviated the
need for disguising the infiltrators." Of course, as
the Laotian situation turned to Hanoi's favor, that
alternative to infiltration was preferred to the
DMZ crossover.
the troops and cadre would move to the major
town of Tchepone in the Laotian panhandle. The
second major route into Laos was west-northwest
along Route #12 through the Mu Gia Pass from
Dong Hoi. From there, the travelers, mostly by
truck, would turn south near the Laotian towns of
Ban Muangsen or Muang Phin towards
Tchepone. The distances in this first leg of the
journey were from about 250 to 400 kilometers.
Travel time could vary from four to seven days.
(D) Both passes, but the Mu Gia Pass in particular,
would earn the special attention of the
American bombing campaign to stop the southern
infiltration. To air force planners, both passes
appeared to be ideal "chokepoints," that, if
reduced, could seriously impede the infiltration
of troops and supplies to the south. So, a special
effort was made to close them. Even the Strategic
(U)
Dropped
span ofthe
Route 9
bridge