spartans_in_darkness

P;L. 86-36
l'QP SESRETHSOMIPfFS*1
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
OGA
(S//SI) At the beginning of~~dI,[=Jwas
able to getout dependents and nonessential personnel
on early evacuation flights. His remaining
staffwas divided intothree contingents. Each one
reflected the increasing importance and relevance
to the primary advisory mission to the
DGTS, as well as the sensitivity of an individual's
position and SIGINT knowledge. The first two
contingents were flown out by mid-April. The last
one was composed of the staff who were the most
knowledgeable about the PAVNjDRV target and
the capabilities of American (and South
Vietnamese) SIGINT to exploit their communications.
CD) However, the situation in Indochina was
getting desperate. On 11 April the Khmer Rouge
troops had surrounded and isolated Phnom
Penh, and President Ford implemented
Operation Eagle Pull to evacuate the last
Americans and the at-risk Cambodian leadership.
The example from Cambodia could hardly be
missed in Saigon. Already, Hanoi was positioning
sixteen divisions around Saigon and its immediate
region for the final assault.
(S//SI)I pware\of the situation, went to
Ambassador Martin to push for the evacuation of
the third contin ent of
I
would desert. He also pointed out that the situation(lr()~nd
Saigon could decay a lot faster than
the ambassadQrlllight think. 105No doubt, as well,
the memories ofthe disasters in Pleiku and
Danang probably were freshinl Imind, and
he did not want a repeat in Saigon.
(TS//SI) Nor was it an encouraging sign that
the NRV was the last non-Vietnamese cryptoloK~\
ic mission left in the beleaguered countr)\"
(Si/SI) Martin's refusal to release the last
civilianShrd upsr the NSA leadership. A message
from describing Martin's stubborn-
..... ~L.._ ___Isaid that he
and three communicators would stay behind and
maintain the communications link between NSA
and the DGTS.
(~//~I) Martin angrily refused I I
request. The ambassador toldl ~hat he was
under orders from President Ford to keep as
many essential people as possible in Saigon:
Martin believed that the DGTS would "collapse"
once the Americans left.1 larglledthat there
was no evidence to suggest that the Vietnamese
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P.L. 86-36