spartans_in_darkness

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foreknowledge: their known ability to exploit
South Vietnamese plaintext and some encrypted
communications links; the existence of communist
agents suchas Colonel Thao and a sophisticated
intelligence reporting radio network that
could quickly tip off Hanoi, a history of previous
knowledge and involvementin prior conspiracies
and coups directed against DieIll,196 and even the
off-chance that Nhu had passed along.such information
to Hanoi through his intermediaries, cannot
be discounted. However, no cornpellingevidence
is available that can point to Hanoi's
awareness of the generals' plot of 1 November,
and this tantalizing possibility remains only just a
suggestion.
CD) With Diem's death and the concurrent
breakup of the Ngo family's hold on the government
of South Vietnam, that frustrating chapter
of South Vietnam's history was finished. So much
for the man whom President Eisenhower hailed
as the "miracle man" of Southeast Asia and Vice­
President Lyndon Johnson extravagantly praised
as the "Winston Churchill of Asia." President
Kennedy, learning of the assassination during a
White House meeting, reportedly was shocked at
the turn of events and left the room. Ambassador
Lodge, on the other hand, invited the mutinous
generals to his office and congratulated them. He
cabled Washington with the optimistic observation
that "The prospects now are for a shorter
war." 197
CD) Three weeks later, President Kennedy was
assassinated. Whether he really was planning to
scale down and eventually end the American
effort in Vietnam, as his apologists maintain, or
he would have continued the presence, pressured
from the imperatives of the Cold War, is
unknown. However, in December 1961 he had
foreseen the dilemma of greater intervention,
especially with combat troops: "The troops will
march in, the bands will play, the crowds will
cheer, and in four days everyone will have forgotten.
Then we will be told we have to send in more
troops. It's like taking a