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gard the regular military chain of command.
Instead, he would come to rely on the personal
loyaltyof a unit and its commander. This further
subverted the ARVN's military effectiveness.
Many of Diem's opponents discovered that he, if
pressed, would agree to any reforms, but would
renege when he regained his position of power. In
the post-coup period, the Americans were further
disenchanted with Diem's political agenda and
the Vietnamese military's again demonstrated
incompetence and unreliability."
ES//SI)American SIGINT had been surprised
by the coup, as had American intelligence in general.
In the coup's aftermath, SIGINT analysts
discovered, through decrypted VC regional headquarter
messages, that the communists were taking
an active interest in the failed coup, learning
valuable lessons from its shortcomings, which
would translate into plans to take advantage of
any future maneuvers against Diem.
E'fS//SI) It also was clear from the intercept
that the attempted seizure of power by the paratroops
had caught the southern communists by
surprise just as much as the Americans. In the
mad scramble for positioning that followed, the
VietCong HQ in the Nam Boregion directed subordinate
elements to help soldiers, officers, and
others (politicians and security personnel)
involved in the coup to escape.I
EO
1. 4. (c)
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