spartans_in_darkness

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(TS//SI) There were six major characteristics
or indicators unique to the 1968 Tet offensive for
which SIGINT could, and did, provide some
amount of information. In order of importance,
from least to most characteristic, they were
• the widespread distribution of newer, more
powerful weaponry to Viet Cong and NVA units,
to include, among others the AK-47 automatic
rifle (the Chinese version of the Soviet-made
Kalishnakov automatic rifle) and RPG-7 rocket
launcher
• special command prescriptions to subordinates
which were meant to reinforce security
practices and instill confidence in the outcome of
the offensive (propaganda)
• the delineation of specific roles for special
Viet Cong units as the first echelon or primary
strike units with regular units of the PAVN and
Viet Cong Main Force units as second echelon or
reinforcements
• South Vietnamese cities and population centers
as the main targets of the attacks
• attacks in all but six provinces of South
Vietnam
• and, last, and perhaps the most critical element
- the one which could be defined as the single
indicator which connected all the preparations
and plans - the existence of the so-called
"N-Day" or the Vietnamese version of "D-Day"
("N" or ngay, the Vietnamese word for day; so
"N-Day" literally means "D-Day.")
(TEll/ElO The first two indicators, the
improved weaponry and the command directives
for increased security and propaganda efforts,
probably would not stand by themselves. They
would have to be combined with the other four to
act as a distinct warning for a general offensive.
The other four were unique enough that any single
one, especially the "N-Day" indicator, could
have connected all the other indicators thereby
alerting SIGINT and intelligence analysts to the
special nature of Tel. The "N-Day" indicator, by
itself, might have been enough; what could not be
a better indicator than the specific date (and
time) of the Tet attack However, as we shall see,
what should have been a clear set of indicators of
an attack were, in reality, not so convincing.
(TEll/ElO The reports that NSA issued
between January 25 and the beginning of Tet,
have virtually nothing to say about the appearance
of new weaponry, nor their wide distribution.
In the special series that began on 25
January, there are some scattered references to
weapons. In Follow-up 1, there is mention of an
unidentified element with three recoilless rifles
and sixty rounds of ammunition. In another part
of the same report, a second unit is cautioned not
to use B-40 rockets (known as RPG-2) against
vehicles.V" In Follow-up 3, there is a reference to
a unit of the PAVN 1st Division having difficulty
moving its cumbersome artillery into position
129
during 26 January.
(TEll/ElI) In fact, we have to look outside the
series to find anything approaching a weapons
inventory. In the Southeast Asia SIGINT
Summary for 19 January, there is an inventory of
weapons shipments by the PAVN Rear Services
organization to seven locations, all located in the
DMZ or I Corps areas. Although there are listings
of sizable shipments of almost 400 AK-47 automatic
rifles, there is also a mix of other small
arms, including bolt action carbines, and 60-millimeter
mortars. Furthermore, from the listing it
is not clear if the weapons were intended for distribution
to troops or were to remain in storage.
13 0 Obviously, the pre-Tet SIGINT reporting
offered little in the way of indications of new and
widespread weaponry among the communist
forces.
(TEll/Ell) The next indicator, what can be
labeled as command prescriptions concerning
security of attack preparations and indoctrination
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