spartans_in_darkness

fOP SEe~~TJleOMI~TiI''' I
. EO
1. 4. (d)
(V) South Vietnamese learn the bastes ofintercepting manual
morse code with pencil or typewriter.
emphasized tactical COMINT support/for the
combat units to the detriment of an/ability to
exploit North Vietnamese strategic and internal
communications.V
(S//SI) In June 1973,~adoffered the
NRV a grocery list of pro~~improve the
DGTS capabilities in the areas he deemed insufficient.
These included sending Unit 15 cryptanalysts,
includingl
Ito NSA for training.
He also agreed to further study the cost of developing
a strategic intercept capability. He promised
to bring the DGTS inventory of equipment
and personnel roster up to requirements outlined
in the VIMP. He also agreed that he needed.to get
DGTS technical COMINT reporting upto standards
- the EMRs and TECSUMs that NSA was
receiving were often inconsistent.P
(S//SI) In April 1974, another evaluation
from tne NRVstaff in Saigon
reported that, within •.. a year of the
departure /Of the AsA DARRs and
CARRS teams, and with'the reduction
of the NSA Special Advisory Team
(SAT) t6 under fifty personnel, DGTS
facilities and mission had deteriorated
significantly. Many more new problems
had surfaced and some old ones
had reappeared. Structural and equipmerit
maintenance, especially with the
all-important antennas,at all of the
sites, whether it was field stations or
the small hilltop bunkers manned by
the LLVI teams, was especially bad.
There were poor applications of intercept
and processing techniques and
methods. The Vietnamese were still
trying to implement the AG-:22 intercept
and processing system ..••. Overall,
but especially at the Saigon Technical
Center, there was a lack of sense for
timeliness and prioritization in SIG­
INT reporting. It was noted that the
DGTS elements around Saigon headquarters
performed generally better;
the farther away, the less effective the Vietnamese
cryptologists were. The Americans hadtoldD
of the problems and, in response, he formed
inspector general-type teams to do surveys of the
field sites and the technical detachmentsl'"
(S//SI) In November of the same ·....~ar,a
report froml
Fentioned that
status within the VIetnamese Joint Genera ta
was "higher than ever before." The DGTS was
providing good tactical product to the ARVNdivisions
through the efforts of the attached ASTDs,
and supplemented by the work of the two processing
centers at Danang and Pleiku. Yet, the
dissemination of intelligence to the national-level
tepartTents and leaders remained a mystery to
He did not know how COMINT was
passed from the DGTS to the various commands
in Saigon. He suspected that the system of intelli-
Page 426
P.L. 86-36
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