spartans_in_darkness

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4. (d)
communist communicationsin and adjacent to
their country. If Thien.survived, the plan stated,
then the prospects for a SIGINT relationship were
good. But if the politicalsituation changed,say a
coalition government was.formed, then the U.S.
resence would have to be reduced
"---""':"":'---:--:-_:--_"""":"'"-=._--...JIn fact, the plan
said nothing beyond FY 1974, except for a
reduced advisory role. In light of what finally happened,
this silence would seem almost prescient.
16. (D) John D. Bergen, The UnitedStatesArmy in
Vietnam: Military Communications.vA Test for
Technology, (Washington, D.C.: Center of.Military
History, United States Army, 1986), 20.
1'-----__----
I
(U)Notes
1. CD) Olson and Roberts, 45.
2. CD) Jeffrey J. Clarke, The US Army in
Vietnam: Advice and Support: the Final Years
(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Military History,
1988),280.
3. (TS//SI) National Security Agency Cryptologic
Vietnamization Implementation Plan CNSAVIMP), 9
November 1970, 2-3.
4. (D) ASA Diplomatic Translation, SIS #58855,
Hanoi to Vichy, 7 October 1942.
5. CD) ASA Diplomatic Translation, SIS #116843,
Vichv to Hanoi,
3 Februarv 1944
7. CD) Ibid., 12.
J/
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23. (g//gI) DSCIB 29.26/4 1957, CCH Series
I XXI.B, Box 10.
9. (U;//gI) Ibid., 11.
10. CD) John Quesenberry, "SIGINT III World War
II: Personal Reminiscences of an Intercept Operator in
China," American Intelligence Journal, Spring!
Summer 1964, 64.
11. CD) Douglas Porch, The French/Secret Services:
From the Dreyfuss Affair to the Gu/.fWar, (New York:
Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, t99S),.309.
12. (D) Ibid., 309.
13. (D) Spector, 150.
14. (D) Davidson, 169.
28. (TS//SI) Ibid.
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