spartans_in_darkness

Tap SEeREfNeOMI'fFH*1
of troops, is probably not unique enough as a tipoff
to the offensive. In fact, as we have seen earlier,
intelligence officers and newsmen who were
aware of the operational plan viewed it skeptically
as one propaganda ploy. The skepticism within
U.S. command and intelligence circles in Saigon
probably diluted any effect this information ever
could have had.
(TEll/SI) There were command cautions
about increased security scattered throughout the
NSA report series. They mostly dealt with units
exercising caution when moving near Allied units
or establishing bivouacs. There were also a reference
to a "communications plan," but this concerned
a single unit, probably a regiment, and
could not be applied to all the communist units in
South Vietnam.l'" Another message, this time to
a PAVN 1st Division unit, suggested that security
was paramount to ability to launch an attack en
masse on "N-Day." 132 Again, this applied to only
a single unit.
(TS//SI) Propaganda or troop indoctrination
was a common feature before all attacks. Appeals
to the offensive "molding character" the emphasis
to the leadership role of the Lao Dong Party,
directives to develop
combat plans in a
"democratic" manner,
and exhortations to
continued strength, all
appear in the reporting
prior to Tet.
Apparently one unit
thrived on the problems
of preparation,
stating that "The problems
continually nourish
us and give us
additional strength
with which to confidently
carry out the
mission." 13:3 Yet, these
instances remain singular
and do not gen-
erally appear in communications of units in other
areas of South Vietnam.
(TSl/Sn Similarly, SIGINT did not reveal the
next indicator, the use of special Viet Cong assault
units as first echelon strike forces with regular
PAVN units and Viet Cong Main Force units as
the second echelon elements. There is only one
mention of any of these units in the series, and it
is a very tentative one at that - the Hue Municipal
Unit. 13 4 In Follow-up 8, there is a single reference
to an unidentified team infiltrating the village of
Chu Kram (possibly in the southern Central
Highlandsj.P" All the other units named in the
series, and this includes all of the reports, are
Main Force Viet Cong and PAVN formations.
ETS//SI) We have the same problem with the
next indicator - South Vietnamese cities as the
main targets of the Tet offensive. Very few cities
are mentioned at all in the pre-Tet reporting.
Those that are mentioned serve as reference
points for troop movement, bivouac location, or
suspected concentrations of communist troops.
Major cities, like Da Nang, Pleiku, and Hue, are
mentioned only in passing. Only a handful of
small towns are listed as targets. In the initial
(U) Viet Conq unit armed with AK-47s and captured u.s. field radios.
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