spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SE6RE"Fh'60MlInH*1
T-339 as sunk, and would continue to do so for
days afterwards."
(8//81) At 1630G (2330Z), the Vietnamese
patrol boat, T-142, received orders to concentrate
back at a location north of Hon Me Island, and to
make contact with another possible Swatowclass
patrol boat, T-165. T-146 also received
orders from Haiphong to send two boats out and
help the P-4s of Squadron 135 to return. 59 Two
days later, on the afternoon of 4 August, T-146
would report to Haiphong the damage to the
boats during the attack. T-333 had been hit three
times and suffered scattered damage to its water
pipes and lifeboat. Its auxiliary engine had been
hit and oil pressure was low, suggesting a leak.
Still, the boat was assessed as being "lightly damaged."
On the other hand, T-336 was described as
being "heavily damaged with many holes." Its fuel
oil was contaminated, possibly by sea water, and
the barrel of one of its deck guns was ruined.""
The boat's crew had suffered at least two wounded
as well. The status of both boats and T-333's
crew is important to remember when we look at
the events of the later evening of 4 August.
(U) In Washington, the reaction to the attack
was relatively subdued. Since no Americans had
been hurt, President Johnson wantedthe event
downplayed while a stern note of protest was sent
to the North Vietnamese. (Ironically, this message
was the first diplomatic note ever sent to
North Vietnam by the United States.) The president
had said that we would not "run away"; yet
we were not going to "be provocative." However,
Hanoi was to be informed in no unambiguous
terms that any more unprovoked actions-would
entail "grave consequences." 61
(8//8I) The lack of anyreprisal was surprising,
especially since freedom of navigation was
one .of the officialreasons for the Desoto missions.
However, it is likely that there were mitigatingfactors
which caused Washington to pause.
Secretary of Defense McNamara was incorrect to
EO 1.4. (c)
claim that the Vietnamese had fired first. 62 At the
same time, the Johnson administration had seriously
miscalculated the reaction by Hanoi to the
OPLAN 34A missions. It had never considered
that the communists might correlate the commando
attacks with the presence of the American
destroyer and retaliate. 6:~ NSA, monitoring the
increasing aggressiveness in DRV naval communications,
had seen the possibility and had
warned everyone, except the Maddox.
(8//8I) Furthermore, Washington, through
the intercept of the DRV's naval communications,
had seen the confused set of orders sent to the
boats, which suggested that Hanoi had lost control
of the situation. McNamara would state, "We
believed it possible that [the attack1had resulted
from a miscalculation or an impulsive act of a
local commander." 64 It seemed that everyone
was trying to defuse the crisis.
-++'r-I-++i++- DIRNSA, concerned about
reactions
'-- ...ordered all the sites in the region to
maintain "extreme collection, processing, and
reporting vigilance on part of all with reporting
accomplished lAW [in accordance with] established
procedures and at prece.d ... ence appro:riate
to activity, especially in regards t~ Jreaction.,,65
A SIGINT Readiness Level Bravo Lantern
was declared. Under-this readiness level, eight
field sites weretasked by NSA to monitor for any
North Vietname§e!
Ireaction to the
patrols.T~ebtimt of the intercept and reporting
was handed to the navy at San Miguel and the
Army and Marine missions at Phu Bai. 6 6
(U) The Pentagon was not going to wait
around for another incident to happen, either.
Plans were put into motion to augment U.S.
forces in the region, including deployment of
United States Air Force combat aircraft to the
Philippines and the dispatch of the carrier
Constellation to join the Ticonderoga. A second
destroyer, the Turner Joy, already had been dispatched
to rendezvous with the Maddox. CINC-
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