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EO 1.4. (c)
43. CU) Oberdorfer, 79. CU) During the force level
discussions of mid-1967, the possible use of American
troops "outside" of South Vietnam was discussed. The
invasion of the DRV was considered and discarded. It
was argued that an invasion of the North, beyond the
actual difficulties in the invasion itself, might stir up
heavy domestic political opposition. The invasion also
could prompt a more active intervention by the
Chinese or Soviets. See United States-Vietnam
Relations, 1945-1967, Book 5 of 12, Section IV.c.6.(b),
76-83,176-77.
44. CU) Ibid., 80.
45. CU) Wirtz, 68.
46. fS//8J.j 2X/G12jVCM/T009-68, 25 January
1968,0525Z.
47.f€t CLi\0487/70,28.
48. CU) Ronnie Ford, "Hanoi's Intent," 74.
49. CU) As quoted in Gibson, 164.
50. CC) Ronnie Ford, Tet, 109-110; Young 207-
208.
51. CD) Oberdorfer, 100.
52. CU) Ronnie Ford, Tet, 106.
53. CU) Oberdorfer, 102.
54. CD) Young, 216.
55. CD) Oberdorfer, 104.
56. CD) Ronnie Ford, 108; Gibson, 162;
Schulzinger, 258.
57. U Youn 212.
o . ie nam over-up: aymg
War with Numbers," Harper's, May 1975, 48.
60. CD) Gibson, 160.
61. CD) Ibid., 159.
62. 'ffl7 Palmer, 50.
63. CU) Harold Ford, 95.
64. ffltPalmer ,,)0' (D) Gibson 161.
sible for a CBS Reports: "The Uncounted Enerny- A
Vietnam Deception," which aired in 1982. This program
repeated Adams' claims and triggered a lawsuit
by William Westmoreland that was settled out of
court.
66. CU) Gibson, 160-161; Harold Ford, 94.
67. ~Palmer, 50.
68. (~//~I) DIRNSA 091556Z September 1967,
AGO 090341, CCH Series v'1.HH.6.s.l
69. CU) Olson and Roberts, 177.
70. (~//~I) 2/0jVCM/RI83-67, 6 October 1967
2228Z.
71. (S//SI) 2/0/VCM/R218-67, 1 November 1967,
2053Z.
72. (~//~I) Glenn, "Uncertain Origins," Dragon
Seeds, December 1972, 12.
73. CD) Oberdorfer, 108-109.
74. CD) Davidson, 469.
75. CU) Oberdorfer, 108:
76. CC) MACV'Iranslation Report, "Ho Chi Minh's
Order for the Implementation of General Counter
Offensive and General Uprising During the 1967
Winter and 1968 Spring and Summer.".MAC.J261, 15
December 1967.
77.f6t Palmer, 55.
78. CU) Harold Ford, 119-l¢O.
79. f67 Palmer 55; Harold Ford, 120. CU) The 8
December report was/received by the National
Security Council staff with much skepticism. A 13
December assessment of the report passed to Walt
Rostow, LBJ'sSpecial Assistant for National Security
Affairs, stated that "it exudes an excessively pessimistie.interpretation
of the facts." It added that
the "Agency [CIA] is overreacting to what it feels is
undue optimism at the top levels of government." See
Memo to W. Rostow, 13 December 1967, Barret,
Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam Papers (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997),467-8.
80. CD) Harold Ford, 121.
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