spartans_in_darkness

ETHeeMIfHfJ}{l
)1
EO 1. 4. (d)
\\
The Joint Chiefs wanteclc=Jtohemade aware
of its concern and for him to bring the SSTB up to
strength "with high quality personnel" while
replacing "below standard personnel." 143
(S/;'sn The effect of these constant personnel
shortages on SSTB operations was considerable.
For example, by early 1972 the SSTB's four field
sites were only at about 30 percent of their
authorized strength.v" The bottleneck was the
quality of the recruits who lacked the technical
aptitude for many of the cryptologic specialties.
The practical outcome of this technical skills
shortfall was the requirement for a much longer
training lead time. So, even though the manpower
levels for the SSTB were nearly met in early
1972 - short only by about 15 percent - the
Vietnamese were not getting their personnel into
productive positions.l'"
(s/;'sn The Americans still questioned the
quality of the Vietnamese SIGINT, even when it
was up and running. Vietnamese cryptanalysts
and traffic analysts seemed unable to merge their
results into meaningful intelligence product.v"
Intercept steerage suffered due to an inability to
perform collection management of intercept
resources. How information was disseminated
from the SSTB to Vietnam's armed forces
remained unclear to American advisors. Local
South Vietnamese military commanders received
little information from their ASTDs. Usually, this
was derived from low-level communist communications.
Intelligence from the central SSTB
centers did reach Vietnamese corps and division
commanders. On the other hand, the Vietnamese
Air Force and Navy did l:t apper to get any
intelligence support from organization.
Nor, for that matter, did t e SSTB even collect
communist communications for the other services.
14 7
(S/;'SI) What emerged after three years of
Vietnamization Certainly, there existed an organizational
structure, replete with functional lines
of relationships, subordination, communications,
and control. The mish-mash of LLVI teams,
ASTDs, field sites, COMSEC units, and the ARDF
squadrons, was brought under a single control.
By 1973, there were over 2,500 personnel in the
SSTB. An air force of sorts had been organized
with almost three dozen aircraft, including EC­
47s and the ubiquitous U-6A, in its inventory. A
complete and modern MRDF net was established.
Secure communi:ations, i~cl~~il1gI-IW...18GA
and HW -19~:rv1SE:C:lllterface equipment, the
"I