spartans_in_darkness

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and the AFSSO operations complex were flown
into Tan Son Nhut. A few months later, the intercept
mission at Tan Son Nhut was moved to
Danang because of the better HF reception there.
(TS//SI) The results of the test were lessthan
dramatic, at least to the personnel of thevtest
team: only two potentialVlfF voice tar ets\. were
detected one North.Vietnamese
'--
...For the 6922th, this intetreat
otential' for the Asian robff'S;';'SI)
At first, the Air Force's VHF intercept
mission at Danang was a bust. The problem
was caused by the terrain surrounding the air
base: on three sides it was closed in by mountains
three to twelve miles away with peaks as high as
five thousand feet. Onl ' the mouth of the harbor
'--
..... The ASA element,
which had been trammg the local ARVN J-7
COMINT personnel manning their own site at the
harbor, had found no VHF; even HF was difficult
to hear. 8 5 Any intercept of VHF communications
emitted from aircraft flying at medium-to-low
altitudes beyond the mountains was almost
impossibla" The only way to hear anything on
the VHF range was to relocate to a better site.
(TS//SI) The lack of VHF interce twas
addressed in October 1 62
"----_..... authorized a review of the Air Force's situation
in Vietnam. The review aimed at rectifying
the initial poor site selection and sought an
upgrade of equipment and antennas at its facilities.
Another part of the review included a survey
of a potential VHF intercept site twelve miles
northeast of Danang, a place known as Monkey
Mountain. The survey team, with all of its equipment,
arrived at Danang from the Philippines in
late October. However, it was the rainy season
and the team had to battle its way up muddy trails
just to get to their site on the top of Monkey
Mountain. The rain had washed out a bridge at
the foot of the mountain; a pontoon bridge was
constructed to get them across. After climbing up
the mountain, they found that their test site was
on the other side of an impassible gully; so they
got permission to set up their camp next to the Air
Control and Warning site. All of this took six
days!"
The
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6925th Group, located in the Philippines, was less
sanguine. It was mainly interested in establishing
an intercept mission in South Vietnam against
the DRV's air force and air defense communications.
8 8 Desite the uneven results,
'--__....I0rdered work on the site to get started.
(TS//SI) In the beginning of 1963, Monkey
Mountain faced two problems. The first, as has
been seen, was the continuing effort to prove
itself as a collector of unique VHF. The second,
which started brewing in the early spring,
involved the effort by NSA to collocate the AFSS
mission at Danang, which included Monkey
Mountain, with the new ASA site at Phu Bai. The
reasoning provided by NSA for the collocation
plan seems to have been driven mainly by an
organizational desire to centralize all of the services
at Phu Bai, the marines already having been
ordered to move in.
(TS//SI) The USAFSS command resisted the
move for three reasons. First of all, the air force
elements that needed the SIGINT support in case
an air war developed were located at Danang.
Second, it was considered that Danang was a
much more easily defendable position in case of
an overt attack from the DRV. The third reason
was that the USAFSSconsidered the potential for
VHF intercept to be as good as that from other
sites. 89 In fact, ASAtests at Danang had indicated
that all intercept at Phu Bai was only marginally
better."
('fS;';'SI) Throughout the rest of 1963, AFSS
and NSA contested the retention of the site at
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