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'FOP SE6REl',f,'60MItHi:*1 OGA ///i // CD) Although all of these categories may seem academic, the Allied intelligence agencies in Vietnam took them seriously and, depending upon their institutional bias or political pressure exerted from command authorities, would espouse whatever countfs) in their order of battle COB) estimates that suited them. The practical result of such "soft" infiltration figures was that Westmoreland's intelligence office, MACV J-2, the CIA, and other intelligence organs could not determine the overall communist troop strength; not knowing how many troops were coming Page 108 TOP SE6RETN60MINT,.,,*1
fSP SESREli','SSMIN"Fh9E1 down the trail rendered communist order of battle projections difficult, at best. (U) This inability to determine infiltration rates would later affect the OB estimates developed by CIA and MACV - especially during the famous Sam Adams controversy - since the question of how many regular PAVNtroops were coming south was important in calculating the communist troop strength facing Allied forces. Bylate 1967 MACV would be claiming that it had reached the "crossover point," that is, the infiltration (and recruitment) rates could not make up for losses suffered in battle. This created the illusion - and one not dispelled by the Johnson administration at the time - that the Indochina War was being won. This illusion was shattered on the morning of Tet. (See Chapter 7, pages 311-313, for more detail on the Sam Adams OB controversy.) (TS//SI) Beginning in mid-March 1964 and continuing into early 1965, SIGINT analysts plotted an expansion of the communications network supporting the infiltration. The network had expanded to eighteen stations with a definite southward thrust of their locations. Two new subordinate control stations appeared. Both were located in Laos: one near Chavane right on the trail, the other near A Rum at the western end of the A Shau valley.84 What American analysts saw, especially at the new station at A Rum, was a significant increase in the amount of communications activity exceeding all previous levels. 85 (TS//SI) What SIGINT had detected, though it could not identify the precise cause, was the change in Hanoi's approach to the war in the south. In December 1963, after the deaths of Diem and Kennedy, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party had met to consider the new situation in South Vietnam. Party secretary Le Duan, who always was an advocate of a stronger, confrontational strategy when it came to Saigon, had urged a greater commitment to the struggle by the southerners. The practical military problem the southern communists faced was the increased firepower of the ARVN forces. With a larger American advisor effort and more numerous, technically sophisticated weapons available, Saigon's forces had the NLF units at a tactical disadvantage. Furthermore, if the Americans intervened directly, then the prospects of an early victory would evaporate. Then the war would become a protracted affair, not unlike the eightyear struggle with the French. In this case, the southern region would be the major battlefield. North Vietnam would become a "revolutionary base for the whole nation," which meant, in essence, the supply effort would originate in Hanoi and that there would be the need to send to the south entire regular PAVN combat units to face the ARVN and the Americans.86 (U) Bythe middle of 1964, supply traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail increased substantially, including large caches of weapons coming directly from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. But, more critically, Hanoi finally dispatched the first regular PAVN unit southward. Instead of a mixed bag of cadre, officers, and specialists, to be dispensed among already established VC units, down the trail came the first complete unit of the PAVN, the independent 808th Battalion. More critically for the course of the war, a few months later subordinate units of the PAVN 325th Division started south. Two of the division's three regiments, the 95th, and 101st, along with its support elements, infiltrated south down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (The third regiment, the 18th, would arrive a year later.) By early 1965, the 325th had settled just inside the Laotian border across from Quang Nam and Kontum Provinces, South Vietnam. 8; (TS//SI) There has been a claim that signals intelligence was first to detect the arrival of the 325th Division.I" Intercept sites did detect increased levels of communications support on the infiltration network. However, the significance of this activity remained obscure to SIGINT fSP SESREfOSSMINfNX1 Page 109 ----- ----- -- - - ---------------- ----- ---~--------
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