spartans_in_darkness

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'EO 1.4. (c)
I
~veferionexistent,
and temporary substitutes were used. 2 2
Within
two days, the unit had set up intercept vans and
organized an analytic and operations section in
two hangars in the corner of the air base. The first
intercept mission, outlined by NSA, was to develop
eighteen Viet Cong illicit, guerrilla, and communist
party communications links, that is, single
station-to-station communications paths.
Aside from developing a picture of the communist
communications network, or the next level of
more complex communications operations, Tan
Son Nhut also was charged with providing usable
tip-offs of radio activity for the associated
Whitebirch DIF mission.P
(S//Sf) For the first time since the U.S. SIG­
INT had systematically tar eted Vietnamese
communist communications
there now existed a conventional
'---_.....
American site actually located in.South Vietnam.
However, the soldiers at-Tan Son Nhut were not
the first American SIGINT personnel in South
Vietnam.
tar-
'-----------------_----1
geted the communications of the variousgovernmental
and military organizations of the established,
host government - mostly intelligence,
internal security organizations, political, and
armed forces commands. However, the extreme
conditions within both Laos and South Vietnam
forced both sites to expand their missions to
include communist insurgent communications.
But, neither site could provide DIF support,
which was exactly what South Vietnamese military
needed.
(S//SI) From the start, however, there was.a
wide divergence between NSA and ASA in the
approach to the Southeast Asian communication
intelligence task as compared with other mission
requirements in the Far East targetingl
(V) 3d RRVOperations area
INSA emphasized the development
'-----_.....
and improvement of its cryptanalytic posture.
But, in February 1961,when the various committees,
boards, and staffs were considering their
recommendations for SIGINT requirements in
Vietnam, NSAtook the opposite tack and insisted
that an increased cryptanalytic effort in Southeast
Asia was not worth the effort.i" Ironically, this
position had been taken in response to the army's
plea for an increased cryptanalytic effort. The
NSAoffice responsible for Asian communist com-
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