spartans_in_darkness

OGA
"FOP SE6RH,\'60MIN"FN)(1
the North Vietnamese so much that they immediately
moved the POWS. 105
~ Other intelligence suggested that the
camp at Son Tay was not what it seemed to be. In
this case, a North Vietnamese POW claimed that
Son Tay had been a "model camp" and had been
used rarely in the two-and-a-half years prior to
the raid. The Vietnamese prisoner added that the
Americans would be trucked into Son Tay for
publicity sessions with foreign journalists.106 This
claim was not true, since Son Tay had been holding
American POWs continuously since mid­
1968.
(U) In January 1971, an article in the magazine
Human Events claimed that "Hanoi circulated
a warning to key military and civilian defense
units that the U.S. was getting ready to stage a
'landing' in North Viet Nam." 107 The article went
on to claim that NSA had intercepted this message,
and that it had been broadcast "shortly
after" Defense Secretary Melvin Laird had
approved the formation of the prisoner rescue
unit. The bottom line to this story was that "the
North Vietnamese moves and their timing have
convinced U.S. military intelligence officials there
had to be a leak in U.S. plans." 108
(S/ fSB The problem with this article, like
many other similar stories, was the vagueness of
the claims. An expression like "shortly after," and
the lack of an actual date of Hanoi's purported
warning make this charge difficult to assess.
What appears to have been the basis behind the
charge was a SIGINT product issued by NSAthat,
in turn, was based on a published translation by
the Army's 7th Radio Research Field Station at
Ramasun, Thailand. The product detailed a 23
October message passed by an PAVN engineering
unit in eastern Laos, subordinate to Binh Tram
217, to its subordinate units that stated since the
dry season was upon them, they should expect
more enemy commando units to be dropped into
their region. The unit specified a number of
points along the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in
eastern and southeastern Laos which might be
targeted by these teams. The.Vietnamese units
were reminded to be on the lookout for
"strangers" and to question anyone, even in a uniform,
who looked suspicious. This warning was
reported by NSA on 29 October 1970 and was
(TS//SI) The problems with this claim, especially
the last statement, were many. For one
thing, as we have seen, the knowledge of the exact
mission of the Task Group was restricted to a few
analysts; collectors and analysts at the various
fixed and mobile intercept missions were not
allowed to know about Adrenalin's purpose.
At the same time, such air transport activity
around the town of Son Tay was not unusual
since it was a jet-capable airfield/and was host to
a variety of DRVmilitary units and facilities. 111 Of
course, the most logical question to ask against
this claim would be: Why /would the North
Vietnamese fly the prisoners tenmiles to another
camp
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