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spartans_in_darkness

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TOP S!eftETf!eOrvmm/X1<br />

EO 1.4. (c)<br />

(8//8I) The F-4 pilots were to use F-lOS communications<br />

procedures and flight rout<strong>in</strong>es to<br />

deceive the North Vietnamese COMINT monitors<br />

and radar operators. The Phantom pilots would<br />

use Thunderchief callsigns and communications<br />

procedures. They would refuel at usual F-lOS<br />

po<strong>in</strong>ts, fly their strike <strong>in</strong>gress routes and altitudes,<br />

and airspeeds. The extra touch of deception<br />

was that the F-4s would carry the F-lOS ECM<br />

pod, the QRC-160-1, that was used for protection<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st the local SAM threat. Extra sets of these<br />

pods had to be specially flown <strong>in</strong> from the stateside<br />

factory while aircrews had to modify the F-4<br />

w<strong>in</strong>g pylons to hold the jammers. Ground crews<br />

also made other physical changes to the F-4s to<br />

make the disguise conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g to the enemy<br />

pilots"<br />

(8//81) A second problem for Olds was to<br />

overcome the major advantage that the MiGs<br />

had, which was their far longer time <strong>in</strong> flight<br />

over target. The MiGs were able to stay <strong>in</strong> their<br />

patrol area for about fifty m<strong>in</strong>utes, whereas the<br />

F-4s could stay for only twenty m<strong>in</strong>utes, if not<br />

engaged. That time dropped to five m<strong>in</strong>utes when<br />

the Phantoms<br />

fought the<br />

MiGs. Olds'<br />

NORT<br />

solution was to<br />

stagger a number<br />

of flights to<br />

arrive <strong>in</strong> fivem<strong>in</strong>ute<br />

<strong>in</strong>tervals.<br />

This way,<br />

fresh Phantoms<br />

would be arriv<strong>in</strong>g<br />

just as the<br />

previous flight<br />

had to leave<br />

because of low<br />

fuel. Olds<br />

planned for two<br />

ma<strong>in</strong> attacks.<br />

The first, stag<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from bases<br />

<strong>in</strong> Thailand,<br />

VIET<br />

would engage the MiGs <strong>in</strong> aerial combat. The second<br />

wave, from the 366thTFW, would stage from<br />

Danang, fly <strong>in</strong> from the east, and arrive over the<br />

Viet-namese bases <strong>in</strong> time to catch the surviv<strong>in</strong>g<br />

MiGs return<strong>in</strong>g to their bases.Jt was a complicated<br />

plan, and the aircrews had to tra<strong>in</strong> vigorously<br />

over a number of days to get their acts down and<br />

coord<strong>in</strong>ate the flights. Almost 100 aircraft,<br />

<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Iron Hand SAM suppression aircraft,<br />

RB-66 ECMaircraft, and n<strong>in</strong>ety combatjets, were<br />

<strong>in</strong>volved.<br />

(T8//8I) SIGINT support came from the<br />

Silver Dawn ACRP mission. The commander 7th<br />

Air Force, Lieutenant General William Momyer,<br />

specifically asked for the <strong>in</strong>volvement of the RC­<br />

130s <strong>in</strong> a tactical control role. The question of<br />

how the planes would be utilized vexed the cryptologists.<br />

Afraid of compromis<strong>in</strong>g their sources,<br />

the decision was kicked up the Air Force Security<br />

Service cha<strong>in</strong> of command.<br />

L..-_---' and AFSS headquarters agreed to this<br />

special use of Silver Dawn. To overcome the compla<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

about the confus<strong>in</strong>g nature of the usual<br />

MiG warn<strong>in</strong>gs issued by the ACRP,a set of special<br />

NAM<br />

8-66<br />

----20· ---~--,<br />

~ Flight routes fot Operation Bolo<br />

Tep SEGRETIIGeMltlTJIX1 Page 253

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