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spartans_in_darkness

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TOP SEe~!TiieOMINTUX 1<br />

deep South near Saigon and would last from<br />

December 1974 to February 1975. Phase two,<br />

which was the critical element, would start <strong>in</strong><br />

March with an attack on outposts <strong>in</strong> the Central<br />

Highlands. It would be supported by a number of<br />

diversionary attacks <strong>in</strong> the Saigon region and<br />

near the DMZ.There would also be fe<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> other<br />

parts of the highlands designed to create confusion<br />

as to the real target. Phase three was to beg<strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong> August 1975 and was primarily a consolidation<br />

phase dur<strong>in</strong>g which Saigon's forces would be<br />

ground down <strong>in</strong> preparation for the "strategic<br />

opportunity" that was certa<strong>in</strong> to appear late that<br />

year."<br />

(U) When the Paris Peace Agreement was<br />

signed <strong>in</strong> 1973, President Nixon secretly had<br />

assured President Thieu that the U.S. would back<br />

his country if Hanoi attacked. However, Nixon<br />

had resigned over Watergate <strong>in</strong> August 1974; the<br />

current <strong>in</strong>cumbent, President Gerald Ford, could<br />

only reassure Thieu of supplies. Congress had, <strong>in</strong><br />

the meantime, put a limit to the aid to South<br />

Vietnam, totall<strong>in</strong>g about 700 million dollars. This<br />

figure has been called <strong>in</strong>adequate by critics of<br />

U.S. policy. The truth is the aid proved to be irrelevant<br />

to the f<strong>in</strong>al outcome: about 40 percent of<br />

the aid actually reached Saigon. The rema<strong>in</strong>der<br />

was either await<strong>in</strong>g shipment or else was unspent<br />

(close to half).56<br />

The F<strong>in</strong>al Days<br />

_Communist advances.<br />

March 1975<br />

~Communis[ advances,<br />

April-May 1975<br />

South Vietnamese<br />

deft' usc l<strong>in</strong>ts,<br />

March IY75<br />

(V) General COUt5e o(the f<strong>in</strong>'ll carnpatqn<br />

(ot South Vietnam<br />

(SiiSI) Throughout late 1974, SIGINT picked<br />

up <strong>in</strong>dications of the North Vietnamese preparations,<br />

although these reports covered troop movements<br />

<strong>in</strong> the northern part of South Vietnam and<br />

to the west and south of Saigon. Communist<br />

activity <strong>in</strong> the critical Central Highlands, especially<br />

the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary attacks <strong>in</strong> late 1974 aga<strong>in</strong>st outposts<br />

protect<strong>in</strong>g the important cities of Pleiku,<br />

Ban Me Thout, and Kontum, was only sporadically<br />

reported. This gap <strong>in</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g probably<br />

reflected the limited collection available to the<br />

NSA analysts from the DGTS sources and U.S.<br />

Tap SEeRE"FNeaMINTHX1<br />

Page 429

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