spartans_in_darkness

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OGA
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own program, assumed control of all ofthese
covert missions. It merged its own-project
---Iand organized
all of the new missions under OPLAN 34A'::64,
L.-
----I10PLAN 34A originally was planned
to last twelve months and was to be a program of
selective intrusions and attacks of graduated
intensity. The purpose of these actions was to
"convince the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
leadership that their continued direction and
support of insurgent activities in the RVN and
Laos should cease." 24
L..-
('fSl/Sf) The OPLAN reflected the current
American strategy of escalation of the war
through graduated response. The U.S. established
four levels of actions; each proceeding one
was a qualitative and quantitative increase in the
sensitivity of target selection and the intensity of
the application of force. It began with harassment
attacks and operations, whose cumulative
effect, though labeled "unspectacular," was to
make Hanoi aware of them to the extent it would
allocate forces to counter them:" Ifthis approach
failed, then the next level - tagged as attritionol
- was to attack important military and civil
installations whose loss could cause "temporary
immobilization of important resources" which, in
turn, might create or increase opposition
amongst the North Vietnamese population to the
government in Hanoi. The third level, termed
punitive by the 34A planners, was meant to cause
damage, displacement, or destruction of those
facilities or installations considered critical to the
DRV economy, industry, or security. To protect
itself from further attacks would mean that the
DRV would have to redeploy resources originally
meant to support the war in the south to the
needs of internal security. The planners admitted
that the operations at this level would involve
large enough forces that they would be necessarily
overt. But the planners felt that these attacks
could be attributable to the South Vietnamese.f"
('fSl/Sf) The final step of the plan was the initiation
of an aerial bombing campaign designed
to damage the DRV's capacity to support the
southern insurrection or cripple its economy to
such an extent that it would realize the extent of
its losses was not worth the support of the war in
the South. At this point, the planners in
Washington believed that Hanoi's reaction to the
attacks would be based on two factors: its willingness
to accept critical damage to its own economy
by continuing supporting the war in the
South, and the possible support of the People's
Republic of China. The plan did suggest that the
communists would choose to continue to support
the southern front, and it left open the possibility
of further operations to offset the anticipated
Chinese aid. 2 7
('fSl/Sf) The major operational components
of OPLAN 34A were airborne operations that
inserted intelligence and commando teams into
North Vietnam, and maritime operations
(MAROPS) which consisted of hit-and-run raids
on coastal installations and facilities. These latter
missions were known under the operational title
Timberwork. The teams were made up of mostly
South Vietnamese Special Forces, known as Luc
Luong Dac Biet or Biet Kich, with some foreign
mercenaries (mostly Chinese and Koreans) to
crew the attack craft. The American involvement,
though extensive in the planning, training, and
logistics portions, was minimized to achieve the
usual "nonattribution" status in case the raids
were publicized by the North. No Americans were
allowed to participate in the actual raids.
(D) Despite all of the planning, there was little
confidence in the effectiveness of the OPLA..~
34A operations. CIA chief John McCone suggested
that they "will not seriously affect the DRV or
cause them to change their policies." 28 Defense
Secretary McNamara, when he returned from an
inspection trip to South Vietnam in March 1964,
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