spartans_in_darkness

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81. (U) Andrews, 342; Ronnie Ford, 182: Harold
Ford, 122. (TS/ lSI) What these materials might have
been has been a matter of some speculation. (1)
Christopher Andrew suggests that it was SIGINT to
which Carver was alluding. (~//~n\The preponderance
of SIGINT reports from the period were tactical
military in nature and pointed to a number of opera:...
tions along the borders and DMZ. (2)
...J (U) Prior to Tet, the North
Vietnamese and NLF engaged in a series of clandestine
diplomatic maneuvers, the most noteworthy being the
"Buttercup" affair in which an NLF functionary
claimed to be authorized to open a negotiations channel
with the U.S. using a proposed POW release as a
sort of goodwill gesture. This affair has been labeled by
Ted Wirtz as a piece of deception or propaganda (dich
van). See Wirtz, 70.1
L...-
0.5. te1 r aimer, ;X); iromcauy, arter 1 et, UOUl
Rostow and President Johnson would cite Layton's 8
December report as specific evidence that they knew
all along about the nationwide attacks during Tet. See
Johnson, 371-372, and Walt Rostow, The Diffusion of
Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York:
MacMillen, 1972),464-465.
84. (U) Oberdorfer, 121.
85. (U) Ibid., 120.
86. (Sl/Sl) 2/0/VCM/R275-67, 23 December
1967,2023Z.
87. (SHSt) Westmoreland, "Estimate of Current
Enemy Strategy," 071318Z January 1968, SC-NLJ­
016/87 B.
88. (Sl/SI) DOSjINR Intelligence Notes, January
6, 1968, SC-NLJ-019/87 B.
89. (8//81) 2jOjVCMjR267-67, 18 December
1967, 1934Z.
90. (Sl/Sl) 2/0/VCMjR250-67, 7 December 1967,
2212Z. P.L. 86-36
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