spartans_in_darkness

Tap SEeRETNeaMIPHNX1
EO 1.4. (c)
(TS//SI) Two factors pressed most heavily in
favor of this site. First of all, with the increased
cryptologic personnel authorizations, DIRNSA
had defined as a new objective the gradual move
away from joint operations with the ARVN under
Whitebirch.P
('fS//SI) More importantly, the scope of the
SIGINT target was changing. Heretofore, the ASA
personnel had been working exclusively against
the VC nets. However, with the growth in the
communist networks and the evidence of Hanoi's
central role within them, it was realized that it
was necessary to collect North Vietnamese communications.
CIA's SIGINT requirements from
March and May 1962 revealed the need for intelligence
on North Vietnam and its activities to the
south. The Agency's shopping list included information
on North Vietnamese troop movements
and strength assessments on South Vietnam's
border regions; logistics support to military and
guerrilla elements in both Laos and South
Vietnam; policy, guidelines, or orders tocornmunist
political organizations or agents operating in
Laos or South Vietnam; unusual construction or
air activity in support of the communist operations
in Laos or South Vietnam; indications of the
presence of military units from the People's
Republic of China; and any information on the
internal situation in the DRV, i.e., resistance and
internal security controls. 140
(TS/lSI) Admiral Frost, the DIRNSA, as well,
was not pleased with the state of SIGINT
exchange with ARVN. During his trip to the
Pacific region in April 1962, he had determined
that the relationship between the ARVN and
American cryptologists within the Whitebirch
program was exceeding its earlier prescribed levels.
Returning to the U.S., he recommended to the
USIB that "I do not accept the idea of Joint
U.S.IARVN SIGINT operations, and further promotion
of this concept must be discouraged." He
added, "Our job is training and assistance in the
technical field and need not exceed Category II X
material." 141
(TS//SI) In the aftermath of the communist
communications change ofApril 1962, there
emerged an urgency in Washington to complete
the establishment of a U.S.-only SIGINT site in
Vietnam. Initially, it had been hoped that this site
could be established in Thailand, but Bangkok's
reluctance to approve a base frustrated the
Americans, so it became necessary to pursue the
plan in South Vietnam.
(TS//SI) Interest had already settled on a
potential site near Hue, known as Phu Bai, about
twelve miles southeast of the former imperial residence.
The location offered access to communi"
cations from both the DRV
L...- ----Iit was clear of the
mountainous topography near Danang which had
so inhibited the ASA DIF mission, as well as the
VHF search missions located there.
(T~//~I) Before any construction could begin,
it was necessary to get South Vietnamese
approval. When General Khanh, Diem's representative
on intelligence matters, was approached
by General Harkins to sign a memorandum of
agreement for the U.S.-only base, he balked. His
concern was simple: that the Americans would
gather intelligence and refuse to share it with
Saigon. He was aware of the new restrictions
being clamped down on the Whitebirch mission.
So Phu Bai was hostage for nearly a month while
another approach was made to Khanh. In the
end, he consented to a "gentleman's agreement,"
one designed to leave the Americans their base,
while Saigon could receive relevant intelligence.
The terms were these:
1. A detachment from the 3rd RRU was to be
established near Phu Bai airport. (ActuaIIy, the
ASA D/F detachment at Danang formed the
nucleus of the new site.)
TOP SESREliVSOMltfFh'X1 Page 151