ancient cities

210 Deindustrialization
power tends to see a totalizing and powerful form
of knowledge pitted against the ordinary citizen.
This lacks a more sociological sense of the mediation
of power by different institutions and actors
within those institutions, all of whom have their
own agendas (or tactics) about their work. Second,
the opposition of tactic and strategy is thus rather
more like a series of gaps or misalignments in a
dance than how it is often portrayed as resistance
or transgression. De Certeau’s tactics are not
politically oppositional; they are evasive of the
orders and plans of the dominant knowledge
rather than forming a coherent, and equally limited,
resistance. Third, his empirical connection to
practices of neighborhood life and walking the
streets connects him to an imaginary of urbane life
that is located in a European intellectual culture
that may not reflect all urban lifestyles. Finally,
these are linked in the sense that de Certeau had a
coherent overall philosophical view and project,
with its own language and terminology. The overquick
use of his terms and ideas in urban studies
can often sound like invocation rather than analysis
and risks losing the subtleties of his work.
See also Architecture; Graffiti; Heterotopia; Urban
Theory; Walking City
Further Readings
Mike Crang
Buchanan, I. 2000. Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist.
London: Sage.
Crang, M. 2000. “Spaces of Practice: The Work of
Michel de Certeau.” Pp. 126–40 in Thinking Space,
edited by M. Crang and N. Thrift. London: Routledge.
de Certeau, M. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life.
Translated by S. Rendall. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
de Certeau, M., L. Giard, and P. Mayol. 1998. The
Practice of Everyday Life: Living and Cooking.
Translated by T. Tomasik. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
De i n D u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
In the 1970s, a new word, deindustrialization,
was invented to refer to the rapid restructuring of
national, regional, and urban economies. Technological
advances in production processes, such as
the use of robots for assembly, made it possible to
produce goods with far fewer workers than in the
past. In the 1970s and 1980s, although the volume
of production increased, the number of manufacturing
jobs fell in many places. Deindustrialization
also occurred because factories left urban regions.
The exodus of firms occurred more rapidly in the
United States than elsewhere because companies
reaped tax advantages for doing so. Firms began
to move from older metropolitan areas to such
places as the Caribbean, Latin America, and
Asia, where wages were much lower and environmental
regulations were lax. This process
was somewhat slower in some countries because
of regulations imposed by national governments.
In Germany, for example, companies were
required to give workers advance notice if they
planned to leave, and they were required to meet
other regulations as well.
Having absorbed one blow after another, and
now facing this final disaster, workers in older
urban regions wondered if they would weather the
storm. The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, region experienced
a 44 percent loss in manufacturing jobs
from 1979 to 1988, three quarters of them related
to steel. Unemployment levels reached as high as
20 percent. In Glasgow, Scotland, shipbuilding
and metal manufacturing experienced dramatic
decline in employment from the mid-1960s through
the 1980s, resulting in unemployment levels as
high as 22 percent. The miles of docklands that
had once been teeming with shipyard workers
stood empty. Hamburg, Germany, lost 46 percent
of its manufacturing jobs from 1970 to 1987. This
experience was duplicated in older port and industrial
cities throughout the United States and
Europe.
But there were glimmers of hope. The number
of service jobs began to rise, though regions and
cities differed in the speed with which this process
unfolded. Over the past decades this historic development
has utterly transformed national, regional,
and urban economies. In seven northeastern and
midwestern metropolitan areas in the United
States, the percentage of jobs in manufacturing fell
from 32 to 12 percent in the 40 years from 1960
to 2000. The largest gains came in services, which
grew from 15 percent of local employment to