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Po l i t i c a l ma c h i n e
During the later nineteenth century and early
decades of the twentieth century, most large U.S.
cities were governed by political organizations
called political machines. Political machines were
hierarchically organized political parties whose
leaders strove to dominate local politics. In cases
when one person controlled the party, he was
referred to as the “boss”; when several shared the
leadership, they were called a “ring.” Beneath the
boss or ring were the ward leaders who, in turn,
were above the lowest level in the hierarchy, the
precinct captains. Examples of strong machines
that coalesced in major cities were the Pendergast
machine in Kansas City, Missouri; the Cox machine
in Cincinnati, Ohio; the Hague machine in Jersey
City, New Jersey; the Reuf organization in San
Francisco; and the Tweed Ring in New York City.
The political machine relied heavily on patronage
to gain and retain power within the city. This
entailed establishing a reciprocal, although generally
unequal, relationship with some of the citizens
and businesses in the community. Patronage, the
exchange of favors for political support, characterized
these relationships. Some of the exchanges
involved significant financial resources. For example,
businesses might receive large contracts for
building infrastructure, such as paving the streets
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607
or constructing municipal buildings. In return,
these business owners would deliver votes for the
machine and provide significant financial
resources to party leaders. More commonly, citizens
in the community, often immigrants, were
asked to vote for the party candidates and to persuade
family and friends to do the same in
exchange for municipal jobs with the city. Jobs,
however, were limited, so often all the party activists
had to offer the immigrants were “social benefits,”
such as friendship, flowers at weddings and
funerals, and perhaps advice on how to cope with
the various problems they encountered.
Leaders of many of these machines were corrupt,
often stealing public monies and pocketing
bribes from businesses that received contracts.
Many bosses were by no means ashamed of these
practices, referring to them as “honest graft” or
resigning themselves to the fact that sometimes
politicians must “rise above principle.” Some bosses
and their underlings were prosecuted for their illegal
activities. For example, both William Marcy Tweed
in New York City and Abe Reuf in San Francisco
were convicted and served jail terms.
Robert Merton, a sociologist, presented a functional
explanation for the rise of political machines
that related the structure and functioning of
machines to the political institutions that preceded
them and to the needs of the different elements of
the growing cities’ populations. He contended that
most cities lacked a centralization of political
authority in the decades following the Civil War.
Therefore, the public sector was ineffectual, and
the political machines developed to fill the void.
Machines centralized power under the bosses and
rings and were able to fill the needs of businesses
and immigrants moving to the cities. In spite of
their espousal of the ideology of business competition,
most businesses, Merton argued, wanted to
negotiate with the party for contracts that would
enhance their profits. Machine leaders were willing
to oblige. They were often just as willing to
address the concerns of leaders of criminal enterprises
as of legitimate businesses.
Machines were also vehicles of upward mobility
for immigrants and other working­class citizens;
they provided jobs with city government and with
private­sector businesses allied with the machines.
And just as machines personalized politics by
working closely with businesses, they provided a