ancient cities

ecomes: How are those interests reconciled in a way
that governance is possible? This question returns us
to the composition and accommodation processes of
governing regimes. By focusing on these two
aspects, regime theory puts the agency and, thus,
the politics back into urban governance and policy.
In restoring agency and politics, regime theory also
restores accountability. If city governments are not
on a deterministic path but, rather, do have and do
make choices, then we can hold decision makers
accountable, and we can pursue alternative policy
directions.
Regime Typologies
Linking regime composition to policy outcomes,
Stone identifies different types of regimes, so different
that he develops a typology to distinguish
them. The logic behind the typology is to underscore
the relationship between policy agendas, on
the one hand, and resources and levels of coordination
necessary to execute those agendas on the
other hand. In ascending order of complexity, we
have maintenance regimes, developmental regimes,
middle-class progressive regimes, and finally, lower-
class opportunity expansion regimes.
Maintenance regimes, which are essentially
caretaker administrations, tend to the basic service
delivery functions of municipal government and
not much more. Consequently, they do not require
much in the way of coordination of actors or
resources. Developmental regimes, which are the
most typical, are organized around the deliberate
alteration of land use patterns to facilitate economic
growth or forestall economic decline. These
regimes are characterized by significant controversy;
a need to coordinate institutional actors and
resources; the generation of selective incentives
such as contracts, jobs, and the like; and the insulation
of as much decision making as possible to
dampen conflict.
Middle-class progressive regimes are centered
around quality of life issues of the environmental
and aesthetic variety, economic issues such as
affordable housing and affirmative action, and
social programs geared toward the less well off. All
of these concerns require regulation or concessions
from private-sector interests. Thus, the cooperative
model that characterizes developmental regimes is
Regime Theory
645
replaced by a more coercive posture. Given the
ability of business to exit, middle-class progressive
regimes rely heavily on the attraction of place (i.e.,
good investment site) and active popular support.
The more attractive an area is to business, the
more leverage the city has in extracting benefits.
Similarly, the more active the public is, the more
power the elected officials have in monitoring the
activities of business. These two requirements,
being an attractive site for investment and having
active public support, render middle-class progressive
regimes in the minority.
The most complex of the regime types is the
lower-class opportunity expansion regime. Such a
regime is committed to a redistribution of resources
for purposes of improving education, developing
the human capital of its citizens, and expanding
local business and homeownership opportunities.
The coordination function in such a regime includes
significant regulation of private-sector behavior.
Unlike the case with middle-class progressive
regimes, the cities most in need of lower-class
opportunity expansion regimes are often unattractive
sites for investment, and elected officials cannot
engineer the kind of mass mobilization necessary to
keep them in office and to take advantage of the
opportunities if and when they are provided. As
desirable and necessary as this regime is, it
remains, as Stone suggests, “largely hypothetical.”
Consequently, much still remains to be researched.
Although the development and continued refinements
of regime theory have advanced our understandings
of governance and policy making at the
local level, the nuances of power and coalition
building provide ripe avenues for additional
research into the workings of local government.
Barbara Ferman
See also Governance; Growth Machine; Local
Government; Public–Private Partnerships; Urban
Politics
Further Readings
Elkin, Stephen. 1985. “Twentieth-century Urban
Regimes.” Journal of Urban Affairs 7(2):11–27.
Ferman, Barbara. 1996. Challenging the Growth
Machine: Neighborhood Politics in Chicago and
Pittsburgh. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.