ancient cities

644 Regime Theory
elected officials have to wrestle with the fragmentation
of the federalist system in which cities are
merely creatures of the state with no legal authority
beyond what their respective state government
grants them.
This fragmentation between economic and
political resources and between levels of government
led regime theorists to focus on the informal
processes whereby elected officials and private
actors (typically those with significant economic
resources) come together in mutually beneficial
ways to further their ends of governance and
economic gain. Clarence Stone refers to these as
the informal arrangements that develop so that
governance can be conducted and policy developed
and implemented. What distinguishes a
regime from a coalition, which can also be described
as an informal collection of stakeholders, is its
purpose and its staying power. Coalitions develop
around a certain candidate or issue and then dissolve
when the election is over or the issue resolved.
Regimes, by contrast, are formed for the express
purpose of governing and, thus, are stable through
at least one mayoral administration and typically
through many administrations, as in the nowclassic
case of Atlanta, which Stone popularized.
Because cooperation is critical to this public–
private relationship but by no means automatic, the
questions of who is cooperating and on what terms
become central to understanding how a particular
city is governed and its overall policy orientation.
Regimes stay together because of the internal
accommodations through which regime members
receive benefits. These benefits will vary depending
on the regime’s composition but may include
public-sector support for economic development
projects, favorably placed real estate developments,
and the like. In return, the public sector
benefits from private economic investment in the
city, which translates into jobs, tax revenues, and
an improved overall viability of the city. Policy is
the result of this accommodation process. Thus,
the composition of the governing regime and its
accommodation processes are two critical components
of regime analysis.
The emphasis on cooperation also presents a
different perspective on power. Stone distinguishes
between the more classic definition of power as
social control (power over) and his conception of
power as social production (power to). Regimes, he
contends, operate on the social production model
of power and thus render the accommodation process
central to regime maintenance and stability.
Power Elite, Pluralist,
and City Limits Theories
Regime theory also provides a necessary corrective to
the earlier and dominant theories of urban politics.
Between the 1950s and 1970s, the two contenders
for scholarly prominence were the power elite and
pluralist theories. Power elite theory, as articulated
by Floyd Hunter, posits that economic elites, by virtue
of the resources they command, essentially call
the shots in urban policy. Pluralist theory, as developed
by Robert Dahl in his research on New Haven
(Connecticut), responds harshly to the notion of elite
dominance, arguing instead that power is both fluid
and widely dispersed, that coalitions form and dissolve,
and that there are no permanent winners or
losers in the urban political setting.
Without engaging in individual critiques of the
two theories, suffice it to say that there are many
holes in the logic and methodologies employed.
The theories, however, share two major flaws.
First, neither theory considers the impact of the
economic system on the city. Second, both theories
treat the city as if it were an autonomous actor, free
from state and federal constraints and directives.
Responding to the shortcomings of these two
theories, Paul Peterson developed his city limits
thesis in 1981. This theory brings the economic
system and the federalist structure back into the
urban equation with a vengeance. According to
Peterson, the overarching constraints imposed by
these two external factors render cities nearly
impotent in terms of impacting their environments.
However, cities are, he maintained, rational actors
with a unitary interest in economic growth. Hence,
the limited capacities that they have will be directed
toward policies that promote economic growth,
which typically translate into large-scale economic
development projects.
Regime theory acknowledges the contributions
of the city limits thesis in bringing in structural factors
(i.e., economic and federalist systems) but
solidly rejects the notion that cities should be
viewed as rational actors with unitary interests. In
the place of consensus, regime theory sees conflicting
interests. The question for regime theory thus