Symposium - AIC

Giovanni R.F. Ferrari
those around him make fools of themselves. It is a situation rich in comic possibilities.
But although the philosopher among his fellow human beings is as a superior going uninvited
to the feasts of the inferior, this is not the condition to which he aspires. In his pursuit of wisdom he
resembles, as we have seen, an inferior going uninvited to the feasts of his superiors. And ultimately,
he would wish to be as the gods themselves could be said to be (and in the Phaedrus, are said to be):
the good going uninvited to the feasts of the good. 2
Both of these latter situations, in fact, are alluded to also in this opening scene between
Socrates and Aristodemus. The allusion is contained in Socrates' garbling of Homer's treatment of
Menelaus. Homer, so Socrates claims, made Menelaus out to be a "soft spearman," while portraying
his brother Agamemnon as a superior fighter; despite which, Homer has Menelaus arrive uninvited, as
inferior to superior, when Agamemnon arranges a feast for the Greek generals at Troy (174b-c).
Aristodemus, ever subservient to his idol Socrates, accepts Socrates' account of Homer without
objection. But Plato's readers should not. Socrates has had to stretch to find that slighting evaluation
of Menelaus' soldierly prowess: it occurs in the seventeenth book of the Iliad (17.587), separated by
much incident from the feast that Agamemnon held in the second book. What is more, it is an insult
put in the mouth of Apollo rather than uttered as a judgment of the narrator. Menelaus in Homer is
generally quite as brave a fighter as most — indeed, Apollo's taunt here is an attempt to discount a
conspicuous act of valour that Menelaus has just performed.
Thus alerted, the reader who considers more closely the incident in Book 2 will recall that the
reason Homer gives for Menelaus having come unbidden to Agamemnon's feast is that, as
Agamemnon's younger brother, he knows the elder's mind without needing to be told: "And
Menelaus of the strong war cry came to him of his own accord, for he knew in his heart the cares that
troubled his brother" (2. 408-9). That is, as one brother to another, he took his invitation for granted
at such a time, even if Agamemnon's worries caused him to forget to include Menelaus among the
formally invited guests. (This is how Plutarch interprets the passage at Moralia 706f.) Although the
brothers differ in status —Agamemnon being the elder and exercising the greater kingly authority —
they belong together by nature.
To the extent that the description "inferior going uninvited to superior" still fits Menelaus'
situation, then, it does so in a positive sense. Although not his brother's equal, he too, like his brother,
is a valiant warrior. And it is with this positive spin that his situation corresponds to the philosopher's
pursuit of godlike wisdom. The philosopher is not equal to the divine; but he has within him the
godlike spark of reason that allows him to aspire, by nature, to associate himself as closely with the
divine as a human being can (as, for example, at the summit of Diotima's ascent, where the
philosopher keeps company with the beautiful itself, 211e-212a). It is with the divine that the
philosopher naturally belongs — ultimately, as the good having gone uninvited to the good.
To seek out invitations, by contrast, is to look for acknowledgment from one's fellows and to
find in this a source of validation. Yet the love that seeks a return of this or indeed of any sort is a less
adequate love than the uninvited love felt by the philosopher for the divine. This is the philosophic
point embodied in the theme of going uninvited in the Symposium. The philosopher seeks creative
self-realization through belonging, to the fullest extent, with that to which the best in his nature is
congenial; he seeks Diotima's "birth in the beautiful," not the quid pro quo that is the basis of the
standard love-affair between Athenian males or of the everyday sacrificial transactions between the
Greeks and their gods. 3 Those who seek invitations in the Symposium duly come unstuck.
We have already seen one such case, when Aristodemus gets left in the lurch on the way to
Agathon's house. Aristodemus, described by his kindred spirit Apollodorus as a "huge fan" or "lover"
of Socrates at the time (erastês, 173b), makes the mistake of loving and seeking sponsorship from
Socrates, rather than simply loving what Socrates loves. That is why he goes barefoot like his idol,
and reports on his every word (173b). He imitates Socrates, rather than the divine. When Socrates
2 These three possibilities for uninvited arrival (good to good; superior to inferior; inferior to superior) naturally suggest a
fourth, which would complete the four-place grid: bad going uninvited to bad. It is a possibility realized at the very end of
the dialogue, when the crowd of drunken revellers break in uninvited on the company at Agathon's house. ("Bad" here is a
relative term, and describes the typical behavior of ordinary Athenians by contrast to the aspirational conduct of
philosophers.) The incident represents and is an instance of complete disorder on a humdrum level. It implicitly
acknowledges the necessity of "invitations" — of mutual acknowledgment and negotiation — to the smooth running of
social life. That the philosopher has the ability to transcend such behavior makes him exceptional.
3 Admittedly, in Diotima's initial description of Eros' role as daemonic intermediary between humans and the gods, the
relationship mediated by "the daemonic" (to daimonion) runs both ways, in the manner of traditional religion: requests and
sacrifices are conveyed from men to gods; commands and returns for sacrifice are conveyed from gods to men (202e). But
her account here is preliminary. Once Diotima has left the "Lesser Mysteries" behind for the Greater (209e), the religious
traffic becomes one-way, as the philosopher ascends, through Eros, to join with the divine. Such communion is its own
reward.
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