Symposium - AIC

Claudia Luchetti
If we analyze the condition of the androgyn, or of the human nature in general, prior to the
dichotomic intervention of Zeus, (189c5-190c1), we can observe a kind of being which is completely
unaware of its bond with the ἀγαθόν, for its possession, -just assuming that at the very beginning it
was really a possession- connaturated to the original structure of the prime humans, is not recognized
as such.
This leads us to hypothize from the beginning the existence of at least two levels of this
φύσις: from a platonic perspective in fact, a non division does not lead to a true unification -διαίρεσις
and συναγωγή imply each other, as we will see- for this unification is initially displayed in an
undifferentiated and unreflected way. Paraphrasing the words that Socrates will use in his speech,
‘one does not desire, what he does not believe to need’ (200a1 ff.), while Eros, which inherited the
indigent nature from the mother Penia, is always ‘needing and desiring’ (203c5 ff.). In a most evident
way therefore, the nature that does not live, but ‘vegetates’ instead, ‘before’ the age of Zeus, lacks
entirely of any kind of erotic tension oriented towards Beauty and the Good, which excludes a priori
the hypothesis of a correspondence between this first typology of androgyn and human, and the
conceptual confluence of ἀρχαία φύσις and φιλοσοφία, with all their consequent epistemic δυνάµεις.
Some clear signals of the negative evaluation of the attitudes of the undivided humans, come
from their description as “tremendous” beings (190b5), and from their comparison with the Titans
(190c4). Even their “huge/unmeasured thoughts” (τὰ φρονήµατα µεγάλα, 189b6), are aimed at
nothing else but the ἀνάβασις to the sky to attack the Gods (190b8-c1). The outcome, a divine
punishment, is the most evident sign of their absolute lack of that inner order (κόσµιοι, 193a4, to
compare with 190e4-5), of Justice (see τὴν ἀδικίαν, 193a2) and of the devotion (εὐσεβεῖν, 193a8) and
friendship towards the Gods (φίλοι τῷ θεῷ, 193b3-4), that in Plato’s view represent, at once, the
premise and aim of the ὁµοίωσις θεῷ, to transform the individual Psyche, as much as possible, in the
‘mirror’ of the invariant and just order of εἴδη (see Resp. VI, 500b8-d2, Theater. 176a5-b3).
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that the notion of ἀρχαία φύσις only occurs in the ‘second’
part of Aristophanes mythical reconstruction (precisely in 191d1-2, 192e9, 193c5, 193d4), while
‘before’ the intervention of Zeus the formulation utilized is the less allusive ἡ γὰρ πάλαι ἡµῶν φύσις
οὐχ αὑτὴ ἦν ἥπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀλλοία (189d6-7). Plato also avoids the use of the possible alternative ἡ
παλαία φύσις, which could have let us thought immediately about Republic X (see 611d2).
The speech instead, of extraordinary intensity, directed from the God Hephaestus to both
halves of the divided humans, takes root in a background that corresponds faithfully to the platonic
vision of the connection between the Soul and the Good: the Souls of each of the two halves are not
“able to say” (192c3, d1) the reason for the thrill that dominates them -having already excluded the
merely sexual meaning of such an excitement (192c5)- when they manage to find each other again
and to “Be together” (συνῶν, 192c6). The two halves can only guess the nature of such an irresistible
desire and express it in an enigmatic way (µαντεύεται ὅ βούλεται, καὶ αἰνίττεται, 192d1-2), and if they
would be asked once more, about their condition, they would still remain in a state of uncertainty and
embarrassment (ἀποροῦντας, 192d5). We are here exactly in the same theoretical constellation of the
book VI of the Republic, 505d5-e3: the Soul, which in the case of the achievement of the Good is
never content with an appearance of it, and searches for it constantly in its reality, always acts in view
of it (see the τούτου ἕνεκα of 505d11 and Symp. 192c6), even when she can only guess what it is
(ἀποµαντευοµένη τι εἶναι, 505e1), being uncertain and unable to grasp its Essence sufficiently -or
satisfactorily- (ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτἐστίν, 505e1-2).
This accentuated parallelism, also helps us to detect a substantial difference of perspective,
which Plato, as writer of the Symposium, is consciously willing to highlight, on which I will focus in
what follows. The ἀγαθόν is not absent at all in the λόγος of Aristophanes: there are explicit
references to it, right at the end of the speech, in terms of happiness and bliss (εὔδαιµον, 193c3,
µακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίµονας, 193d5), and of the attainment of that best (ἄριστον, 193c6, c7) descending
indeed from the reconstruction of the ἀρχαία φύσις (193c2-5).
Despite this, the Good is not the primary goal of the Souls yearning to piece together their
ancient nature: unconscious of what they really wish to obtain from their lost half (191c2-4), they do
not desire anything else but “becoming again, from two, one” (ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι, 192e8-9);
therefore they pursue the “totality” (τοῦ ὅλου), because their previous condition was to be as
“wholes” (ὅλοι, 192e10), meaning by this that they were absolutely One (ἕν ἦµεν, 193a1-2).
Emblematic by Aristophanes is the priority of ἔν on ἀγαθόν: contrary to what emerges from a
synoptic consideration of the concept of ἀρχαία φύσις in the dialogues, the Good is said here to be a
consequence of being One, and not its αἰτία.
Diotima, or on the One as Good.
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