Symposium - AIC

Lesley Brown
ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς; Ὁµολογεῖν (199e7). 5
As well as being used in the narration of conversational exchanges, it is also used within those
conversations themselves, especially those of a dialectical nature. As Wardy noted, the stretch known
as the elenchus of Agathon contains ‘a sustained stream of ὁµολογία vocabulary’, though I don’t
agree with him that it is ‘without parallel in the Platonic corpus’. 6 In Section III I examine what I
have called the declarative use, ὁµολογεῖν (1).
ὁµολογεῖν (2), to promise, is also a very common use of the verb, even if somewhat rarer, in Plato,
than (1). When Agathon praises Eros for never using force, he remarks that all serve Eros willingly,
and ἅ δ’ἂν ἑκὼν ἑκόντι ὁµολογήσῃ (whatever is undertaken willingly on both sides) the laws call just
(196c1). At 198c5 and 199a 5 Socrates uses the verb when he claims to have been unaware of the
rules of eulogising when he promised to take his turn in praising Eros. 7
But before these everyday and unremarkable occurrences we have a stretch making important
use of ὁµολογ- vocabulary where it is harder to classify the uses: the speech of Eryxymachus. To back
up his claims about the ubiquitous importance of Eros, Eryxmachus appeals to Heraclitus’ saying
(187a4-6) on the unity of opposites, τὸ ἓν γάρ φησι “διαφερόµενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συµφέρεσθαι,” “ὥσπερ
ἁρµονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας” . He goes on to criticise it in a short stretch containing six occurrences
of ὁµολογ- vocabulary. How intriguing, then, that in Plato’s version of the Heraclitus saying itself we
find not the word ὁµολογεεῖ transmitted by Hippolytus, but συµφέρεσθαι. Most scholars accept
Plato’s version as the correct one, though Kahn is a fervent proponent of reading ὁµολογεεῖ : an
‘unexceptional text transmitted by our most reliable ancient source.’ 8 Marcovich, who is among the
majority preferring συµφέρεται, offers the reason that ‘Plato uses this word although ὁµολογεῖ would
better suit his purpose’ –sc. given the argument Eryximachus proceeds to mount invoking ὁµολογ-
terminology. 9
Leaving aside the question of the text of the Heraclitus fragment, I turn to Eryxymachus’
comments on the saying, which many have found crass. In response to Heraclitus invoking the
harmonia of a bow or a lyre, Eryxymachus retorts:
ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἁρµονίαν φάναι διαφέρεσθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφεροµένων ἔτι εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἴσως τόδε
ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφεροµένων πρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον
ὁµολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς µουσικῆς τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφεροµένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος
καὶ βαρέος ἁρµονία ἂν εἴη· ἡ γὰρ ἁρµονία συµφωνία ἐστίν, συµφωνία δὲ ὁµολογία τις—ὁµολογίαν δὲ
ἐκ διαφεροµένων, ἕως ἂν διαφέρωνται, ἀδύνατον εἶναι· διαφερόµενον δὲ αὖ καὶ µὴ ὁµολογοῦν
ἀδύνατον ἁρµόσαι—ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθµὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος, ἐκ διενηνεγµένων πρότερον,
ὕστερον δὲ ὁµολογησάντων γέγονε. τὴν δὲ ὁµολογίαν πᾶσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἰατρική, ἐνταῦθα ἡ
µουσικὴ ἐντίθησιν, ἔρωτα καὶ ὁµόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐµποιήσασα·(187a6-c3)
But it is quite illogical to say that a harmony is at variance, or composed out of things that are still at
variance. Perhaps what he meant to say was that it has come to be from the high and the low, which
were previously at variance, but which then later struck an agreement under the agency of musical
expertise. For surely if the high and the low were still at variance, a harmony would not come from
them, for harmony is concord, and concord is a kind of agreement, and it is impossible for agreement
to come from things at variance with each other, for as long as they are at variance with each other,
and impossible in turn to harmonise what is at variance and not in agreement; just as rhythm, too,
comes about from the quick and the slow, from things which had been at variance previously, but
which later struck an agreement. What establishes the agreement among all these things, like
medicine in its sphere, is music, by implanting in them love and unanimity with each other. (tr. Rowe
1998).
Rowe (1998 p 149) protests against this criticism: ‘of course something can be simultaneously
in disagreement and in agreement, if what’s meant is something like a bow or a lyre’, and again ‘ we
do not need to ask whether ‘the high and the low’ are the sort of things that could strike an agreement;
who would seriously disagree that a ‘harmony’ in the sense defined [sc. a set of sounds which a lyre
5
However, nowhere in the corpus do we find “οὐχ ὡµολόγει”, despite Euclides mentioning it as one of the tiresome
narrative devices he will avoid (Tht. 143c).
6
Wardy (2002) p 51. Protagoras 350c6-e7 is one passage where ὁµολογία terms are found in a greater density.
7
198c6 ἡνίκα ὑµῖν ὡµολόγουν ἐν τῷ µέρει µεθ’ ὑµῶν ἐγκωµιάσεσθαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, / 199a5 οὐ δ’ εἰδὼς ὑµῖν ὡµολόγησα καὶ
αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ µέρει ἐπαινέσεσθαι.
8
Kahn (1979) 195-9. He renders ‘how a thing at variance with itself speaks in agreement’, and argues that it must echo or
anticipate D50: ο ὐ κ ἐ µοῦ , ἀ λλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀ κούσαντας ὁ µολογεῖ ν σοφόν ἐ στιν ἓ ν πάντα
ε ἶ ναι.
9
Marcovich (1967) p125.
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