Symposium - AIC

Philip Krinks
By using the participle of the verb to be (ōn), translated ‘is’ above, and literally meaning ‘being’, he
means that one must describe what erōs is like, and that that same description must also show how
erōs can make those gifts to human beings.
The next sentence confirms this:
‘There is one correct way for any praise of anything: to go through in one’s speech what kind of thing
(hoios) it happens to be (ōn), such that it is cause (aitios) for the things (hoiōn), concerning which the
speech (logos) is made’ (195a1-3)
The verb ‘to be’ and its participle ōn appears again, but this time with the notion of ‘cause’ (aitios)
being explicit. Agathon’s principle is that there must be an explanatory or causal link between the
characteristics of erōs and what the gifts are. One must say what kind of thing erōs is, such that it is
thereby shown how erōs is responsible for the gifts.
The reader might think that seems a fair enough principle for the praise of erōs. But it is not
clear that Agathon is correct to say the others failed to honour it. It seemed that each symposiast had
his reasons to say that his description of erōs explained it being beneficial. For example, Phaedrus had
his reasons to say that the great age of erōs explained it being beneficial.
Agathon’s complaint is aimed, however, specifically at the structure of their praises:
‘It is just for us also to praise erōs first himself for the kind of thing he is, and then his gifts’ (195a3-
4)
The problem, then, is, in the first place, with the descriptions. If erōs is to be praised ‘for the kind of
thing he is’, then he must be described as something which is in itself praiseworthy. But the others’
descriptions of erōs (as old, co-working with Aphrodite, pervasive in the cosmos, and so on) are not in
themselves praiseworthy. When Phaedrus made his modifications to encomium convention, having in
mind, I suggested, previous attacks on erōs, the result was a strategy to defend erōs which was
indirect. This indirect strategy characterised erōs in a neutral way (as opposed to the negative
characterisations offered by the attackers), and then showed how on some neutral characterisation
erōs provided benefits to humans and was therefore defensible. Until now, noone has questioned this
indirect strategy. Agathon does, and requires instead that the description of erōs should itself show
how erōs can cause benefits. 16
One reason Agathon might doubt the indirect strategy, is that he might hold, as some pre-
Socratic philosophers seem to have done, that what causes something to be F must itself be F: that Fness
must be somehow transmitted between the two. 17 This then suggests a more direct strategy,
where the description of erōs would be as in itself praiseworthy. erōs can be defended as literally
putting its own beauty and goodness into human beings, being in that sense directly the cause of
human beings becoming beautiful and good. The accounts of beautiful and good given by Agathon
then reflect that: a subjectivist account of beauty, where erōs pours beauty into y, in the sense that it
makes y see z as beautiful; and a reductive account of goodness, where erōs is a strong psychological
compulsion which determines right conduct, defined as acting according to the strongest compulsion.
VII: CONCLUSION AND COROLLARY OBSERVATION
The early speakers’ explicitly reflect on method. Phaedrus’ methodological focus is to demonstrate
causality, with erōs is praised as cause (aitios, 178c2) of benefits for humans. Pausanias’ focus is
human praxis (181a1) in all its specificity and context. Eryximachus’ focus is a complete (telos,
186a2) praise. Aristophanes’ focus is acknowledging power (dunamis, 189c6). Agathon’s focus is
intrinsic characterisation: to show ‘what the characteristic of erōs is’ (hopoios tis, 194e7), such that he
gives us these things: else, it is not explained how he does.
Their reflections structure and unify the early part of the dialogue. Their speeches respond to
those preceding. The stated methodological focus of each speaker shapes his speech. Methodological
questions raised by the desire to praise erōs are explored.
A corollary observation, which can only be stated here, concerns the structure of Socrates’
speech. It is the others’ principles which structure Socrates’ speech. After Socrates introduces his own
16 Sedley (2006 p.55f.) is right to highlight this: my interpretation has several points of contact with his
17 On the pre-Socratics, v. Barnes 1979 e.g. vol.1 p.88f. On Plato’s consideration of this question in the Phaedo and
elsewhere, v. Sedley 1998 e.g. p.119
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