Symposium - AIC

II
Edward C. Halper
With this understanding of Socrates’ argument, we can turn to Alcibiades’ speech. It is obvious that
he has not climbed the ladder of loves. Had he done so, he would likely have been at the symposium
with Socrates and the others. If Alcibiades lacked the intellectual capacity to climb the ladder or if he
were not a lover, he would not pose a problem for Socrates’ account. If, however, neither of these nor
any other exception to the account applies to Alcibiades, he is a counterexample to that account. In
this case, just as Socrates’ speech undermines those that come before, the speech of Alcibiades would
undermine Socrates’ argument that climbing the ladder is necessary.
Whereas the other speakers deliver encomia to love, Alcibiades gives an encomium to
Socrates, even though he came to the banquet intending to crown Agathon (212e). One repeated
theme is that Socrates runs after all attractive boys (213c-d, 216d, 222b), but that he not really love
with any of them. Others, perhaps other speakers at the banquet, may feign an interest in philosophy
to secure physical intimacy, but Alcibiades suggests that Socrates feigns an interest in beautiful boys
to engage them in philosophy (218a-b). Without having heard Socrates’ speech, Alcibiades comically
describes how it feels to be the beloved of someone who climbs the ladder of loves from the love of a
particular boy to the universal love of all beautiful bodies.
A second theme of Alcibiades is Socrates’ moral character. This is what he refers to when he
compares Socrates to a statue of Silenus, ugly on the outside but filled with “gods” (215b). The
“gods” are the virtues. That no one is more moderate in his sexual appetites is illustrated by Socrates’
firm resistance to Alcibiades’ most explicit enticements (217a-219d). His moderation in respect of
food, drink, and physical comfort is evidenced by his imperturbability to hardships, including the
cold, on military campaign (219e-220c). His courage is manifest at Potidea where Alcibiades claims
he outshone the notably courageous Laches and not only rescued Alcibiades but insisted that the latter
receive an award for courage (220d-221b). It is clear from this description that Socrates has attained
the beauty of the soul that he describes as the next rung on the ladder of loves (210b-c). In
consequence of this beauty he “gives birth to such discourses as make young men better” and comes
“to gaze on the beauty of activities and laws” which he sees as akin to his own soul. Alcibiades fully
recognizes the aim of these discourses and their power, he acknowledges his shame in resisting them
(215e-216c).
The next rung of Socrates’ ladder is the love of knowledge, an object that he must come to
after the love of laws (210c-d). As we saw, Socrates claims that the lover of knowledge creates many
beautiful speeches and eventually comes to the knowledge of Beauty itself (210d). Gazing on Beauty
itself, his soul becomes truly virtuous and immortal (212a-b). This step of the ladder receives cursory
treatment in Alcibiades’ account. He ascribes knowledge (φρόνησις) to Socrates (219d), he speaks of
the Socrates and his companions, including himself, as smitten with the madness and Bacchic frenzy
of philosophy (218b), and he mentions Socrates’ arguments about blacksmiths, cobblers and other
ordinary activities that, nonetheless have deep inner meaning and are important for becoming truly
good (221d-222a)—arguments that could as well stem from the preceding rung, the love of the
beautiful soul. 5 But what probably best describes Socrates’ love of knowledge, the practice of
philosophy, Alcibiades can only describe externally, as his standing fixed to a place contemplating a
philosophical problem all night (220c-d). 6
My aim here is not to summarize Alcibiades’ speech, but to rearrange it to understand its
import. Alcibiades warns us that his speech will be disordered—he ascribes this to his own
drunkenness and Socrates’ bizarreness (214e-215a). When we unscramble his speech, we see that
Alcibiades covers precisely the same ground as Socrates. He, too, describes the ladder but, of course,
from his own perspective. He makes clear what Socrates cannot say without arrogance, that Socrates
has climbed the ladder himself. (By putting the speech in the mouth of Diotima, Socrates can
describe the ladder without implying that he himself has stood at the summit.) Alciabiades’ account
of Socrates’ love of knowledge is brief and external, likely reflecting his lack of direct personal
engagement with philosophical issues, as I said. It contrasts sharply with his description of Socrates’
love of all physical beauty and of beautiful souls: here Alcibiades’ understanding and appreciation are
profound. Of all Socrates’ interlocutors, Alcibiades is the only one who gives a description that
comes close to grasping who he is. Meletus, Meno, Gorgias, and Protagoras appreciate the power of
Socrates’ intellect, but they cannot grasp his ideas. Alcibiades understands Socrates’ virtues, he
5 C. D. C. Reeve, “A Study in Violets: Alcibiades in the Symposium,” in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and
Reception, ed. James Lesher, Debra Nails, Frisbee Sheffield (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2006), 129,
141: “Alcibiades’ portrait [of Socrates] unwittingly mimics Diotima’s.”
6 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 184, recognizes this last as sign of Socrates’ ascent.
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