Symposium - AIC

Gabriel Danzig
about the possibility that wealth acquired by legitimate means may nevertheless wind up in the hands
of those who have no real need or good use for it and no intelligent ability to reapportion it, since this
would raise doubts about his own right to the wealth he possesses. By demonstrating that this
understanding of justice is wrong, Socrates not only advances the understanding of justice, he also
undermines Cephalus’ personal claim by right to the resources on which his status depends and
advances the claims of those who, like himself, may possess the virtues that merit the wealth they do
not possess. 27
While this kind of self-interested speech may seem out of place in a serious philosophical
investigation, it is actually a necessity of Socratic philosophy, because Socrates’ aim in his
conversations is not so much to discover the truth about a question as to investigate his interlocutor
and raise question that impel him or her to change his or her character, mentality and behavior. This
goal is announced in many of the dialogues, but nowhere more clearly than in Symposium, where
Apollodoros berates his anonymous listeners, who represent the audience assembled at a reading of
the composition, for leading worthless lives, spending their time in pursuit of money rather than
devoting their time to Socrates (172c-173e). Sincere boasting, praising oneself for the things one is
and does, is an essential pre-requisite for this process.
The boastful speeches we find in Symposium and elsewhere take the form of implicitly selfflattering
claims about the nature of things. Because they are claims about the world, they have an
objective quality and can be brought into conflict with other contrary claims. When this occurs the
result is not merely the refutation of a theory, and the embarrassment generated is not merely the
embarrassment of being shown not to know. If the principles refuted are genuine reflections of the
character, mentality and behavior of the speaker, the result is the refutation also of the person who
espouses it. This is why Socrates is so happy when his interlocutors speak the truth as they see it
(Gorgias 486d-487d; see Republic 367e-368b): this not only gives him an opportunity to investigate
the proposition being proposed – which would be possible even if the person were not sincere about it
– but also to examine the principles that motivate the speaker personally. When these principles are
refuted, the speaker must either turn hostile or suffer a breakdown. For this reason, the level of
personal competition is much higher in the Socratic dialogues than it would be in a disinterested
conversation about philosophical issues, however eager the parties are to prove themselves right. The
aggressive, personal flavor of the Socratic conversation is better captured when we recognize that the
subject is not merely what is the best way of life, but rather whose life is better, mine or yours.
Refutation
Symposium resembles a Socratic dialogue because it contains a refutation of the selfinterested
arguments of the previous speakers. Criticism is not a uniquely Socratic privilege in a
symposium, of course. All the speakers criticize the others. For example, Pausanias offers mild
criticism of Phaedrus, saying that he has not distinguished between the heavenly and the common
forms of love (180c-d). This is a criticism of his speech, and does not carry major implications for
Phaedrus as a person -- unless we are to suppose him an especially promiscuous young man who fails
to discriminate among lovers, for which there is no evidence at all. 28 Socrates however offers criticism
that applies more directly to Phaedrus when he argues that no one dies for the eromenos but for
immortal fame (208c-d). This argument denies Phaedrus’ effort to redeem the eromenos and himself
by claiming that he inspires acts of virtue. Phaedrus may provide the occasion for noble sacrifice, but
he is not its object, and therefore does not deserve the honor he appropriates to himself by the
description of love he offered in his speech. This is not a devastating critique, but it is of a piece with
Socrates’ general reduction of potential eromenoi to the role of useful implement for higher
achievement (compare the role of the beautiful in facilitating giving birth).
More serious is Socrates’ critique of Pausanias. He is a different kind of target: as a lover of
Agathon, he is a potential rival to Socrates, who has set out this evening to enjoy Agathon’s company
(174a). This means that the attack will aim not to reduce him to the status of a useful eromenos, but
merely to push him off. The attack on Pausanias is carried out in two waves: first in the speech of
Socrates himself and then in the speech of Alcibiades.
One indirect, but undoubtedly distressing, criticism is found in Socrates’ critique of Agathon. By
forcing Agathon to acknowledge that he does not know what he was talking about (201c), Socrates
27 Similarly, Charmides defines sophrosune as quietness or slowness, characteristics that would, if true, make him a paragon
of virtue. Euthyphro attempts to define piety in a manner that will justify his own actions against his father. Lysis defines
friendship in a manner that would validate his own friendship with Menexenus.
28 In fact, his behavior in Phaedrus shows him to be quite snobbish in his choice of lovers.
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