Symposium - AIC

Lesley Brown
“reconnaître”, “concéder” (que). “Reconnaître” (I believe) is a factive verb; I cannot say of someone
‘il reconnaît que’ p but then go on to deny p myself. Nor (I think) can one say we were wrong to
reconnaître that so and so. But both of these are possible, as I shall show, for Greek ὁµολογεῖν (1).
Here is my evidence that when speaker A describes B as ὁµολογεῖν a certain thesis, speaker A need
not endorse the thesis, or imply that anyone else holds it. Sometimes when Socrates uses ὁµολογεῖν to
refer to what the interlocutor assents to, he plainly does not endorse the thesis.
(i) At Meno 79, Meno has accepted both (1) to do whatever one does with justice is virtue and (2)
justice is a part of virtue. Socrates continues:
So it follows, from what you assert (συµβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁµολογεῖς) that doing whatever one does with
a part of virtue, that is virtue. (Meno 79b4-5)
The conclusion – virtue is doing what one does with a part of virtue – is one that is rejected, so at
least one of the premises must be rejected too. When Socrates addressing Meno uses ὁµολογεῖς,
Socrates is certainly not endorsing both (1) and (2).
(ii) Next recall the famous self-refutation argument in Theaetetus : 13
Socrates: Secondly, it has this most exquisite feature: as regards the opinion of those who hold a
belief contrary to his opinion (namely the belief that his is false) Protagoras – I presume – concedes
(συγχωρεῖ) that theirs is true, seeing that he professes that all men judge what is (ὁµολογῶν τὰ ὄντα
δοξάζειν ἅπαντας). Theod: Undoubtedly. Soc: And if he agrees (ὁµολογεῖ) that the opinion of those
who think him wrong is true, then wouldn’t he be conceding (συγχωροῖ) that his own opinion is false?
Theod :Necessarily. Soc. But the others don’t concede (συγχωροῦσιν) that theirs is false? Theod:
Indeed not. Soc: But Protagoras, for his part, admits (ὁµολογεῖ) this judgement to be true, given what
he’s written. (Theaetetus 171a6-b8)
You will note that this passage has three uses of συγχωρεῖν and three of ὁµολογεῖν. I’ll come back to
the difference between these. For now, it is the first occurrence of ὁµολογεῖν that provides me with
the evidence I want: ὁµολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας (171a8-9). Socrates is noting that
Protagoras professes that all men judge what is, i.e. that all beliefs are true. Now this – that all beliefs
are true - is something Protagoras alone believes or maintains, so it is wrong to render it (as translators
regularly do) ‘seeing that he agrees that …’. The verb ὁµολογεῖν here indicates merely that the person
in question gives it as their opinion that p. This text shows it can’t be taken to imply that in giving a
certain opinion they are concurring with the speaker, or with any other parties.
(iii) We find just such an occurrence in our dialectical stretch in Symposium 201b9. Socrates is
challenging Agathon’s description of Love as beautiful. He has got Agathon to admit that Love
desires what is beautiful and that one loves what one lacks and does not possess; so Agathon will have
to admit that Love is not beautiful. In the course of this stretch we get (201a10) ὡµολόγει and a line
later Socrates asking/reminding Agathon thus: Οὐκοῦν ὡµολόγηται, οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ µὴ ἔχει,
τούτου ἐρᾶν; ‘Wasn’t it agreed/ maintained that etc.’ For those two occurrences ‘agree’ is harmless
enough, but now see what follows. (201b9):Ἔτι οὖν ὁµολογεῖς Ἔρωτα καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως
ἔχει; To translate ‘agree’ here is surely incorrect. 14 Dover (1990) ad loc has noticed a problem, but his
comment shows that he clings to the meaning ‘agree’ for ὁµολογεῖς. He writes: “‘agree (sc with
popular belief)’; Socrates himself does not believe that Eros is καλός”. I find this implausible. To cast
around for another party with whom the question implies Agathon shares the view – as Dover does -
is unnecessary. Instead we must recognise that, unlike ‘agree’ (and unlike ‘reconnaître’ and
‘concéder’), ὁµολογεῖν does not trigger the presupposition that some other person shares the view
which someone ὁµολογεῖ. Waterfield 15 has it right with ‘Do you still maintain that Love is
attractive?’. 16
Why does this matter? I think it can affect how we understand the tone and implications of
dialectical exchanges; they may be far less consensual than the translation ‘agree’ suggests. When
Socrates is the speaker, his uses of ὁµολογεῖν (to record or recall what has been said) are typically
taken to imply his endorsement of the theses in question. This matters for how Socratic inquiry is
13
I pass over issues of text and interpretation of this argument. Cf L.Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation (2010).
14
Rowe (1998) ad loc ‘Do you still agree that Love is beautiful?’. Wardy (p51) wrongly cites it as ‘a final invitation to
agree’.
15
R.Waterfield tr Plato’s Symposium, Oxford World’s Classics 1994; cf C. Gill (Penguin tr) : Do you still suppose that …’
16
Cf. Menander’s Samia (524, cf. 651) The Samian woman, Chrysis, to help a pair of lovers, is pretending that the girl’s
baby is her own. When the young man eventually explains the situation to his father, he says ‘Chrysis is not the child’s
mother, she’s doing this as a favour to me ὁµολογοῦσ’ αὑτῆς,’ (proclaiming that the baby is hers). Once again, ‘agree’
would be wrong as a translation here.
38