Symposium - AIC

Olga Alieva
difference between the two; finally, both texts deal with χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς motif and are
fallaciously reasoned. 24 But Pausanias’ speech has one important novelty as compared to the Dissoi
logoi, namely the protreptic element.
Pausanias is not interested in defending the paradoxical thesis that µὴ ἐραστᾶι χαρίζεσθαι καλόν; he
aims at more: it is only noble to gratify a lover for the sake of wisdom and moral perfection (see
above texts 6, 8) 25 . The pursuit of virtue justifies, in his opinion, δουλεία ἑκούσιος (184c2; cfr.
ἐθελοδουλεία 184c2-7). In full compliance with this practice, Alcibiades wants to gratify
(218d4: χαριζόµενος) Socrates in order to become better (218d2: βέλτιστον …γενέσθαι).
In the Euthydemus, 26 where Socrates invents his own protrpetic, the interlocutors are driven to the
conclusion that there’s no disgrace in being a slave for the sake of wisdom (282b 27 ). Narcy justly
observes that in both cases the use of the verb προτρέπω recurs in a context where the case in point is
the exceptional value of wisdom. Philosophical protreptic therefore involves what Narcy labels as
“monopoly on seduction”. I’ll try to demonstrate that such understanding stems from Antisthenes, to
whom Plato playfully alludes in the Symposium.
Antisthenes: ἀξιέραστος ὁ σοφός
The extant fragments of Antisthenes abound in scornful remarks concerning “worldly” love and
pleasure. “I would rather go mad than enjoy pleasure”; 28 “If I could catch Aphrodite I would shoot her
with my bow, because she has corrupted so many excellent and beautiful women among us” (SSR V
A 122−123) 29 and so on.
On the other hand, as Kahn puts it, Antisthenes “has a much more positive conception of
philosophical eros in the sense of intimate friendship among intellectuals in pursuit of virtue.” 30 Thus,
he says: “the wise man will be in love for he is the only one who knows whom one should love” (SSR
V A 58 = DL VI 11 31 ) and “it is the sage who is worthy of love and friend to one like himself” (SSR
V A 99 = DL VI 105 32 ).
It is difficult to account for these inconsistencies unless we assume that Antisthenes distinguished
between the two Eroses: a vulgar one and a philosophical one, just like Pausanias does. This
assumption is indirectly corroborated by a passage from Xenophon’s Symposium (VIII. 10) where
Socrates draws a distinction between the vulgar and the heavenly Aphrodite. 33
Furthermore, it is likely that in Antisthenes eros was endowed with educational function. The above
cited fragment from Diogenes Laertius (see note 32: ἀξιέραστος ὁ σοφός) is taken from the writing
Heracles where Antisthenes showed τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι. There, Heracles was depicted as one
to gratify lovers”; “in Ionia and many other regions where they live under foreign sway, it is counted a disgrace”. The latter
practice is then associated with the despotic rule peculiar to the barbarians (text 3).
24
Pausanias’ argument is circular: if there is nothing noble or base “by itself”, any “manner” under certain circumstances
can be regarded as either noble or ignoble. Besides, there is a fallacious slip: what is “by itself” neither noble nor base turns
out to be indispensable for attaining moral virtue.
25
See note 54. However, with “wisdom” he means no more than persuasiveness in speech. See: Rosen, op. cit., 89.
26
Michelini notes certain parallelism between the protreptic in the Euthydemus and Pausanias’ speech; see: Michelini, A.,
“Socrates Plays the Buffoon: Cautionary Protreptic in Euthydemus”, American Journal of Philology 121 (2000), 509-35.
Rappe argues that the Euthydemus “exhibits a number of familiar Cynic trademarks, or rather motifs that strikingly
anticipate Cynicism, (apparently) associated with Socrates’ follower Antisthenes”; see: Rappe, S., “Father of the dogs?
Tracking the Cynics in Plato’s Euthydemus”, Classical Philology, 95, 3 (2000), 282-303. On Antisthenes’ Protreptic see our
paper in the Socratica III volume “Protreptic in the Socratics: In Search of a Genre” (in print).
27
Narcy, op.cit., 114. On slavery for the sake of virtue as a protreptic motif see: Slings, S.R., Plato, Clitophon, Cambridge
(UK), 1999, 117-118.
28
Translation is cited from: Kahn, Ch., “Plato as a Socratic”, in Hommage à Henri Joly, Recherches sur la Philosophie et le
Langage 12, Grenoble, 1990, 287-301, here 289.
29
See especially Theodoret. Graec. Aff. Cur. III. 53 (SSR V A 123): αὐτίκα τοίνυν ᾿Αντισθένης ὁ Σωκράτους ἑταῖρος καὶ
Διογένους διδάσκαλος, τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ πλείστου ποιούµενος καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν µυσαττόµενος, τοιάδε περὶ τῆς
᾿Αφροδίτης λέγεται φάναι «ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ᾿Αφροδίτην κἂν κατατοξεύσαιµι, εἰ λάβοιµι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡµῶν καλὰς κἀγαθὰς
γυναῖκας διέφθειρεν». τὸν δέ γε ἔρωτα κακίαν ἐκάλει τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἥττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίµονες θεὸν τὴν νόσον
καλοῦσιν. ταύτῃ τοι µανῆναι µᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι ᾑρεῖτο.
30
Kahn, “Plato as a Socratic”, 289.
31
DL VI 11: (τὸν σοφὸν) γαµήσειν τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν, ταῖς εὐφυεστάταις συνιόντα γυναιξί. καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δέ· µόνον
γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν.
32
DL VI 105: Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον
ὑπάρχειν· ἀξιέραστόν τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀναµάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁµοίῳ, τύχῃ τε µηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν.
33
Kahn remarks that though this passage “has certainly been influenced by Pausanias’ speech in Plato’s Symposium”,
“Xenophon’s distinction between carnal and noble eros is much more simplistic than anything in Plato” and “it probably
reflects Antisthenes’ distinction between the bad eros based on pleasure” and “the morally sound eros based upon virtue and
wisdom in the beloved.” See: Kahn, “Plato as a Socratic”, 290.
156