Symposium - AIC

Yuji Kurihara
final clause that shows purpose, according to this emendation the final stage of the ladder consists in
(b) knowing Beauty itself as a result or purpose of (a) reaching the science of Beauty. This differs
from the reading of (i), which supposes that both (a) and (b) constitute the final stage, 9 whereas (ii)
posits a causal or teleological relation between (a) and (b), specifying (b) as the final stage. Although
Christopher Rowe, who, like most scholars, supports (ii), notes that “none of the editorial solutions to
the problems looks particularly attractive, but none makes much difference to the sense,” 10 we must
stress that whether we adopt (i) or (ii) does affect our understanding of the final stage of the ascent, so
we must be more cautious in considering the relation between (a) and (b).
What, then, is the telos of the ascent? We must answer this philosophical question by referring
back to Diotima’s original account of the ascent at 210a4-211b5, which our passage merely
recapitulates. As a matter of course, we will find a similar, but more complicated description of the
final stage of the ascent at 210c6-e5. After beautiful activities, says Diotima, the guide must lead
(ἀγαγεῖν sc. δεῖν) the lover to the different kinds of knowledge, so that (ἵνα) the lover may next see
(ἴδῃ) the beauty of the kinds of knowledge and may no longer be (ᾖ) worthless and petty by clinging
to particular beautiful objects, but may give birth to (τίκτῃ) many beautiful, magnificent words and
thoughts in unlimited philosophy, contemplating the great sea of beauty, until (or in order that; ἕως
ἄν) he will behold (κατίδῃ) a certain single kind of knowledge, which is of Beauty itself. Diotima then
calls Socrates’ attention to the issue of finality and continues as follows: the lover, who comes now
towards the final goal of matters of love, will suddenly behold (κατόψεται) Beauty itself.
Obviously, just like its recapitulation, this description reveals a causal or teleological relation between
seeing the beauty of kinds of knowledge and seeing the single knowledge of Beauty itself. It is also
clear that in addition to seeing the knowledge of Beauty itself, Diotima further mentions seeing
Beauty itself, without specifying their mutual relationship. It seems natural that these two distinct—at
least verbally—activities of seeing correspond to the above (a) and (b) in the recapitulation,
respectively. 11 If so, our understanding of the relation between (a) and (b) will directly serve to
explain the telos of the ascent in the original description.
Let us now turn to the other attempt to understand our two problematic subjunctives. S. R.
Slings tries to elucidate them in context and concludes that the text is correct. 12 After asserting that no
solutions introducing a conjunction explain the corruption, Slings compares our two relevant
passages—210c6-d6 and 211b7-d1—and argues that the subjunctives without ἵνα describe the final
stage of the ascent. He points out three factors that combine to produce a reasonable account: first, in
Diotima’s original description “the steps themselves had been in the infinitive and the result in the
subjunctive,” whereas in the recapitulation “the whole process focuses on the result.” Second,
describing the stage of knowledge, Diotima uses the lengthy ἵνα clause including three subjunctives:
ἴδῃ, ᾖ, and τίκτῃ. Third, in the recapitulation “the whole process of ascent is in turn one long string of
prepositional phrases,” depending on and following the single infinitive ἐπανιέναι: “psychologically
speaking, it is easy to understand that after all the prepositional phrases the influence of this infinitive
is weakened.” “Therefore,” Slings concludes, “when a new verb is necessary,” the parallelism
between the original account and the recapitulation “causes a shift from infinitive to subjunctive.”
Judging by the textual fact that the sentence including the subjunctives in question, which
itself is extraordinarily long, condenses and recapitulates even more complicated original sentences,
Slings’s solution seems to me attractive by appealing to the speaker’s psychology in this passage.
Moreover, in examining several passages in the Platonic corpus, Slings shows that “the rules and
habits of the spoken language, in other words, oral grammar, do indeed play a decisive part.” 13 I
prefer to accept this account, which is based on “oral grammar,” to emending the text, for it is
plausible that Plato is here most vividly imitating and representing an oral communication between
Diotima and Socrates, in full awareness that the subjunctives are “ungrammatical” in the written
language. What, then, does Slings think of the final stage of the ascent? By reading the subjunctives
as they stand, he must take it for granted that καὶ (211c8) is a copulative conjunction; he then must
hold that the final stage consists of (a) seeing the knowledge of Beauty and (b) seeing or knowing
Beauty itself, 14 which is in agreement with the reading of (i). Slings, however, does not explain what
9
It is, of course, possible that καί is a consecutive καί, “and so,” in which case the final stage itself can be divided into two
steps.
10
Rowe (1998) 200.
11
Scholars agree that ἐπιστήµη and µάθηµα are interchangeable here.
12
Slings, (1997) 208-10, to my knowledge, is the only scholar who reads the text as it is, except Nehamas and Woodruff
(1989) 59 n.93, who note on τελευτήσῃ: “Here we follow the manuscripts, rejecting Usener’s emendation. The finite verb
form of the manuscripts is more vivid”; but they take καί like ἵνα and translate: “so that in the end he comes to know…”
13
Slings (1997) 204.
14
Slings, (1997) 210 n.92, actually denies splitting up the final stage into two parts, criticizing Burnet’s solution that changes
16