Symposium - AIC

Harold Tarrant
70
Chart 1: Cluster analysis of selected Socratic texts
Olympiodorus’ ‘protreptic’ section of the Alcibiades I (119a-124b: = Alc1Protr, far left), in which
Socrates, offering concerned guidance of an almost parental character, makes excellent use of the
things that queens of Persia and Sparta might say about Alcibiades, is placed closest to both blocks
into which the program had split the Menexenus and to Symposium 201d-212b. The role of women in
all four blocks suggests that there may be some common linguistic feature that affects how Socrates
speaks when trying to think like Aspasia, Diotima, and Amestris or Lampido. The only other four
blocks that are closely linked with these linguistically are the spurious Axiochus in which Socrates
urges Axiochus to face death bravely, the palinode of the Phaedrus (in two parts) and the myth of
Protagoras. Do they too offer some kind of quasi-parental voice, perhaps, or is there some overlap
between the language of myth and female language? Diotima is of course herself a myth-teller, and as
we show the tale of Poros and Penia is linguistically more extreme than most myths.
This suggestion of a link between the voices of women and of story-tellers may be of wide
relevance to the Symposium. To many of Socrates’ contemporaries, notably Thrasymachus (Rep.
350e2-4) and Callicles (Grg. 527a5-8), little was thought as unreliable as a story coming from a
mature woman. Even taken alone, neither story nor female voice is ordinarily a source of authority for
an Athenian, and either could readily be dismissed. But much the same could be set of ‘sympotic
literature’ altogether. No speaker at this symposium or at the one presented by Xenophon commands
great authority, for that is not what is expected of a contribution towards sympotic entertainment. And
further, the proem’s account of the tale’s oral history (172a1-173b8) and Aristodemus’ documented
lapses of attention (180c1-2, 223b8-c1), are enough to undermine any confidence the hearer has in the
accuracy of the narrative on offer. Plato is not forcing beliefs on us here; his speakers compete in
offering worthy praise of the god Eros (177c2-7, 197e5-7), not in offering anything reliable (198c5e4).
He invites us to relax and enjoy an entertainment, which may well conceal truth upon reflection,
but seldom masquerades as literal truth.
Even the comments made upon the diction are such as to reinforce our sense of incredulity,
beginning with Apollodorus’ assertion that the wise teach him to use cheap jingles (185c4-5),
continuing with Aristophanes’ determination to deliver a laughable speech (189b4-7), proceeding on
to Socrates’ affirmation about the refined Agathon speaking like the haughty Gorgias (198c1-2), and
finally to the enigmatic suggestion that Diotima, approaching the climax of her speech (208c1), spoke
‘like the ultimate sophists’. One never knows what, if anything, to take seriously for it seems that
Plato spends the whole dialogue being coy, and hiding his jewels well beneath the surface. 2
Even so, it could be argued that the very language used in some speeches invites us to
2 Cf. Alcibiades on Socrates, 216e.