Symposium - AIC

Edward C. Halper
eternal (cf. 29d-30a with 37c-d). 3 In my view, the reasoning in both dialogues is cogent because both
are making the same implicit assumption: what is good persists, whereas what is bad does not. As
Plato has Socrates explain in the Gorgias, the craftsman brings about order and organization in a
matter and, doing so, he makes it good (503e-504e; cf. Tim. 30a). That is to say, the craftsman
creates a being by ordering and organizing a matter. What enables this object to be is also what
allows it to persist in being, and the order that allows it to persist fits the artifact to do its job and,
thereby makes it beneficial. So, in creating offspring, acts, or speeches that persist, the lover not only
has a share of eternity, but necessarily has a share in the goodness, that is, a share in the principle of
order and organization, that allows there to be things that are, to a greater or lesser degree, eternal.
A sign that this reasoning, or something like it, is implicit in the Symposium is that we can
now understand how the lover differs from those who pursue the good in other ways and also how one
lover differs from another. The lover strives to possess the good by creating something that will be
organized in such a way that it could persist forever. Thus, the lover’s need for the Good is met by
creating an imitation of the Good, and he can be called a lover because he has resourcefulness to make
such an imitation. These imitations differ in how long they persist and, thus, how well they imitate
the Good. A beautiful speech is assumed to be more long lasting than a child and the beauty “in”
which the creator of the former creates is closer to Beauty itself than the beautiful body in which the
latter creates. Hence, lovers who produce the former come closer to possessing the Good forever than
the latter. Perhaps a parent comes as close to eternity with successive generations of offspring as the
author of a beautiful poem, but the latter has a more immediate and direct role in creating an object
that could itself persist eternally and his creation is intrinsically better because it occurs “in” the soul,
something closer to Beauty itself. Inasmuch as nothing generated by the lover could ever be truly
eternal, his desire to possess the Good must motivate him to be ever generating anew. Finally, since
all lovers strive to possess the Good forever by generating objects (in the presence of Beauty), since
some objects, those that are more long-lasting, allow their generator to come closer to their goal,
lovers must constantly seek to generate objects that are more long-lasting. That is to say, the lover is
forced by his need to possess the Good forever to exercise his resourcefulness and continually seek to
generate those objects that, being closer to eternity themselves, will bring him closer to his goal. To
be sure, not everyone is capable of climbing this ladder. Indeed, most people remain on its bottom
rung. Nonetheless, for those who are capable, the necessity of climbing the ladder is the result of the
nature of love.
This explanation of the logical necessity of the climb involves three components, the beloved,
the lover (who is resourceful and needy), and what he generates. However, the goal of the climb is to
gaze on Beauty itself, and one who does so (a) knows what it is to be beautiful (211c8-d1) and (b)
gives birth to true virtue (212a2-7). This latter must be the virtue that is simply knowledge, the goal
of all Socratic dialogues. But there is an ambiguity here, for (a) and (b) both belong to the lover.
Does the ascent end when the lover himself comes as close as humanly possible to being Beauty itself
or when, because of this encounter, he somehow generates true virtue in another? Indeed, a parallel
issue pervades the account the beauty of a beautiful body inspires generation in that beautiful body,
and the result is another individual; but the beauty of a young soul inspires beautiful speeches that
make that soul better (210c). How can the beloved benefit from these speeches if he is already
beautiful, for insofar as something is beautiful it needs nothing? Presumably, he becomes still more
beautiful in soul. Presumably, it is part of climbing the ladder to generate, first, something wholly
external to beauty, a child, then, some increase in the beloved’s beauty, and, finally, one’s own self as
beautiful. The first of these offspring do not truly belong to the lover. Only at the ultimate level is his
product himself. At that stage, the lover becomes more like Beauty itself, self-sufficient and able to
inspire virtue in others. Surprisingly, though, there is no real mutual interaction. The lover creates;
the beloved does not. There is nothing here about the mutual love of lovers, both centerpieces of the
accounts of love in the Lysis (212b-213c) and the Phaedrus (253d-257a) 4 and both essential for
human relationships to endures. On Diotima’s ladder, only the lover’s relation with Beauty itself is
legitimate. Human love falls by the way.
3 David Keyt, “The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus,” The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 230–35, claims that the
Demiurge mistakenly imitates the nicks and scratches of his model, rather than its substantial character.
4 This lengthy passage could be read as Socrates’ reply to Alicbiades’ speech were it not apparent that the mutual benefit it
describes did not occur. Note that 256a-b illustrates the proverb Socrates mentions at Symp. 174b.
376