Symposium - AIC

Gerard Boter
predicate more than anyone else, we should realize that καί in the apodosis indicates that besides the
man or thing under discussion there are others for whom the same qualification is valid, although it be
to a lesser degree (however, not stated explicitly).
In Xenophon’s Hiero we read (X. Hier. 7.13): ἀλλ’ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, ὦ Σιµωνίδη, λυσιτελεῖ
ἀπάγξασθαι, ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι τυράννῳ ἔγωγε εὑρίσκω µάλιστα τοῦτο λυσιτελοῦν ποιῆσαι, “Ah,
Simonides,” he cried, “if it profits any man to hang himself, know what my finding is: a despot has
most to gain by it, since he alone can neither keep nor lay down his troubles with profit.”
(Marchant/Bowersock) Here, the superlative meaning of the phrase is stressed by µάλιστα.
O’Brien 9 goes one important step further than Kühner-Gerth: he states that in some passages
in Plato the phrase must mean “to the exclusion of anyone (anything, anywhere) else”, which in fact is
the meaning he needs for his interpretation of the philosopher as the only one to attain immortality. I
might style this as the “exclusive use”. As instances, O’Brien mentions three passages in the Phaedo. 10
At Phaedo 78c we find: εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ µόνῳ προσήκει µὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα,
εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ; which is translated by Hachforth as: “Isn’t it incomposite things alone that can
possibly be exempt from that?” Strictly speaking, the phrase is a contamination of τούτῳ µόνῳ
προσήκει µὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα and τούτῳ προσήκει µὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ. But the
exclusiveness here results from the addition of µόνῳ, not from εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, and therefore this
passage cannot serve to prove O’Brien’s thesis. 11 In the other two instances adduced by O’Brien the
exclusive interpretation appears to hold; thus at Phaedo 65c Socrates says: Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ
λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; “If then any part of reality is
ever revealed to it, must it not be when it reasons?” (Hackforth) Here reasoning is dichotomically
opposed to physical perception; in the preceding sentence Socrates had said that the soul is deceived
by the body and thus it is clear that reasoning is the only valid way of reaching the truth. 12 This use of
the formula εἴπερ τις ἄλλος corresponds to the English idiom “to him, if to any human being”. In fact,
O’Brien goes still further: he makes a switch from the plain exclusive use of the phrase (“he alone is
immortal”) to a qualified exclusivity (“he alone is immortal in the real sense of the word”). 13 But this
switch is nowhere hinted at in the text. Moreover, in O’Brien’s interpretation we would have to
assume that the word ἀθανάτῳ is being used in two senses at the same time: personal immortality for
the philosopher and immortality through procreation for other men.
For O’Brien’s interpretation of the philosopher as the only one to attain real immortality it is
essential that εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ has an “exclusive” meaning. The
exclusive interpretation of the phrase is also found in the majority of translations. See for instance:
Rowe, “to him, if to any human being”; Susanetti, “e, se mai fu altro uomo, immortale?”; Boll-
Buchwald, “und, wenn es überhaupt ein Mensch erreicht, gar unsterblich?”; Brisson, “Et si, entre tous
les hommes, il en est un qui mérite de devenir immortel, n’est-ce pas lui?” 14 But is this “exclusive”
interpretation acceptable in our passage? It is not.
I have already noted that the presence of καί in the apodosis is an unmistakeable indication of
the “inclusive superlative”; in our passage we find καὶ ἐκείνῳ in the apodosis. What is more, there is
abundant explicit mention of others to whom immortality applies: in fact, the whole of Diotima’s
speech from 206c on aims to demonstrate that living beings, both animals and men, successfully strive
for immortality by means of procreation. And therefore, when Diotima says that if it happens to
anyone else it will also befall the philosopher to become immortal, we have to take this as an inclusive
superlative. 15
9 O’Brien 1984, 197, n. 34.
10 Phaedo 78c, 65c and 66a.
11 For the illogicality of the phrase, Rowe 1993 ad loc. refers to Phaedo 62a, εἰ τοῦτο µόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν
ἐστιν, “that this alone of all the other things is without exception”, which, as Verdenius 1958, 197-198 states, is “a
contamination of “this alone of all things” and “this as distinct from other things”.”
12 The other passage adduced by O’Brien, Phd. 66a7-8, runs as follows: ἆρ’ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιµµία, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος
ὁ τευξόµενος τοῦ ὄντος; “Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?” (Fowler) I agree
with O’Brien that the phrase is exclusive here. There is an interesting textual problem in this passage: καί is found in the
majority of the medieval mss. but it is omitted in TV and Jamblichus and probably it was absent from the papyrus as well.
The word is bracketed by Burnet but accepted by Rowe and Strachan (the editor of the new OCT), as by the majority of
editors. Because of the exclusive meaning of the phrase I side with Burnet: καί is inappropriate here.
13 O’Brien 1984, 197, n. 34: “A clause of this kind is therefore an appropriate idiom with which to contrast the philosopher’s
true immortality with the mere semblance of it achieved by other men.”
14 See also, e.g., Sedley (2009, 160), “and to him it belongs, if to any human being, to become immortal”; Robin, “n’est-ce
pas à celui dont je parle qu’en reviendra le privilège?”; Joyce, “if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be
given to him”; Howatson-Sheffield, “it is possible for him (...) and to become, if any human can, immortal himself.”
15 Here are some instances of correct renderings of the phrase: Ferrari, “e, se altri mai, immortale anch'egli?”; Reale, “e sarà,
se mai un altro uomo lo fu, egli pure immortale?”; Schleiermacher, “dem gebührt (...) und, wenn irgendeinem anderen
Menschen, dann gewiß ihm auch, unsterblich zu sein”; Rufener, “und dann kann, wenn überhaupt ein Mensch, auch er
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