Symposium - AIC

Richard Stalley
an appeal to what he claims are Athenian customs. These forbid the pursuit of young boys, but
encourage lovers to go to great lengths in the pursuit of those who are somewhat older. At the same
time the objects of these attentions are expected to resist. The point of this, Pausanias claims, is to
distinguish the common lovers, whose desire is purely physical, from those whose love is directed to
the soul and who seek to benefit the loved ones by making them wise and virtuous. Only this latter
group should be gratified (181b-182a).
Although Socrates has already pointed out that mere physical contact cannot transfer wisdom
from one person to another (175d-e), Pausanias assumes, without argument, that gratifying a lover’s
desires can advance a young man in wisdom and virtue. His frequent references to nomos suggest that
he is relying on the prejudices of his social milieu rather than on a clear conception of what makes life
worth living. Even more striking is his account of Athenian customs. These, he claims, encourage
lovers to engage in extraordinary kinds of behaviour — beseeching and begging their loved ones,
swearing oaths and camping out on their doorsteps.They are even forgiven for breaking vows made
under love’s influence. By Pausanias’ own admission, such behaviour would not be tolerated in any
other circumstances (83c-d). He even claims that a lover should place himself in a kind of voluntary
slavery to his beloved. So he clearly does not expect lovers to exercise moderation and self-control.
All this is in marked contrast to the views Plato expresses elsewhere. In the Republic he argues that
the correct kind of love is a sober (sōphrōn) love of order and beauty and has nothing mad or
licentious about it. A lover may, therefore kiss and touch his beloved, as a father would, but no more
(403a-b). In the Laws he again outlaws homosexual intercourse and, tellingly, points out that it could
not be expected to promote virtue. It would not foster courage in the one who is seduced, nor
sōphrosunē in the seducer (836d).
Eryximachus presents himself as a man of sobriety. Early in the dialogue he portentously
claims medical authority for the utterly obvious point that drinking can be harmful. His own speech
starts with the claim that love is a force at work throughout nature. Medical science supports
Pausanias’ view that it is twofold. In particular the love a body displays in so far as it is healthy is
quite unlike the love it displays in so far as it is sick. Pausanias claimed that it is a fine thing to gratify
the love of good men, but not that of the bad. Similarly one should gratify the healthy elements in the
body and refuse gratification to the sick ones. Medicine is thus the science concerned with bodily
loves. The skilled practitioner replaces sick forms with healthy ones.
Some features of this passage recall the Gorgias. There Socrates relies heavily on an analogy between
bodily health and sickness, on the one hand, and virtue and vice on the other. The skilled doctor
allows healthy patients to satisfy their bodily desires, but restrains sick patients from doing so.
Similarly the wise statesman restrains the desires of licentious people and so creates order and
harmony in their souls. But important elements in the Gorgias are missing from Eryximachus’ speech
In the Gorgias medicine stands to the body as statesmanship does to the soul. These are
genuine crafts because they seek the good of their respective subjects and rely on reason. They must
therefore be distinguished from their bogus counterparts, oratory and cookery, which seek pleasure
and rely merely on experience. Thus the Gorgias insists that the happy and virtuous life requires a
knowledge of the good which only philosophy can provide. Eryximachus, on the other hand, blurs the
distinction between soul and body. The same power of love operates in both. So it looks as though
any account Eryximachus could give of sōphrosunē would be based, like his original warning against
over-drinking, on physiological grounds. We must not indulge desires when that would cause pain or
discomfort or would hinder our enjoyment of other pleasures.
Eryximachus goes on to argue that pretty well everything can be explained in terms of the
interaction of opposites, such as cold and dry, sweet and sour, dry and moist. The art of medicine
creates love and agreement between elements which would otherwise be hostile to one another.
Similarly music creates love and agreement between high and low in pitch and between fast and slow
in rhythm. This confirms that we should gratify and preserve the ‘heavenly love’ which takes orderly
people as its object and tends to improve those who are not yet orderly. We should however exercise
caution in tasting the pleasures afforded by the common kind of love so that we do not thereby
become involved in debauchery (186d-188d).
Here Eryximachus introduces the key idea that the goodness of the soul consists in order and
harmony. But there are important differences between the way in which he deploys this idea and its
use by Plato in dialogues such as the Republic. There the fact that we can experience opposite desires
is used as an argument for the tripartite division of the soul (435a-441c). But there is no suggestion
that the parts of the soul, as such, are opposed or that virtue consists simply in a balance between
them. In an unjust soul the desires of the three parts will conflict, but in a just soul there will be no
conflict because each part does its own work. Reason will govern, with the aid of spirit, and appetite
202