Symposium - AIC

Edward C. Halper
understands that the homey arguments Socrates is always making aim to produce virtuous souls, he
sees Socrates’ actions as a manifestation of his virtue, and he loves Socrates because of his virtue
(219d). 7
Why, then, does Alcibiades remain unaffected by those arguments? Why does he not himself
become virtuous? Why does he not come to appreciate law or to be a philosopher? This cannot be
because he is not led rightly or intellectually deficient; for Socrates is his teacher, and Alcibiades
understands Socrates—far better, it seems, than Apollodorus or Aristodemus, both of whom we know
from the dialogue’s beginning did try to emulate Socrates. Alcibiades understands Socrates so well
that he must “stop [his] ears and tear [him]self away from [Socrates], for, like the Sirens, he could
make [Alcibiades] stay by his side till [Alcibiades dies]” (216a-c). 8 Indeed, there is some reason to
think that Alcibiades truly desires philosophy, for he wants to seduce Socrates in order that the latter
might teach him all he knows (217a). He may suppose that a fallen Socrates could not refuse to teach
him how to win arguments (cf. 213e; Prot. 336b-d), 9 but, again, he sees that the arguments Socrates
constantly uses are “of the greatest importance to anyone who wants to become a truly good man”
(222a). Alcibiades understands the ladder of loves, but he does not climb the ladder. No one is more
disappointed in himself than Alcibiades, yet he says nothing by way of self-defense or explanation.
(Instead, he speaks to his audience as the “jury . . . that is to sit in judgment of Socrates’ amazing
arrogance and pride” [219c]—as if Socrates is on trial rather than himself.) The depth of appreciation
that Alcibidades displays for Socrates makes his own failure to pursue philosophy unintelligible and
that, I suggest, is Plato’s point: Alcibiades serves to undermine the universality that Socrates claims
for his account. Alcibiades recognizes his need for the good, and he has the resourcefulness to pursue
it—as evidenced here by his resourcefulness in contriving circumstances in which to seduce Socrates.
Apart from Socrates’ soul, he loves Agathon for his beauty; but he does not climb the ladder. 10
Evidently, Socrates is wrong about love.
There is another dramatic detail here that raises questions about Socrates’ speech. Alcibiades
compares Socrates to Pericles and other orators (215e4-7); Socrates clearly gets the prize. Although
he breifly refers to his arguments (λόγοι at 221d7-e1 cannot be “speeches”), there is nearly no
mention of dialectic. The only place Alcibiades does mention it points up how ineffecutal it is:
Socrates ignored Alcibiades’ attempts to seduce him and continued his usual dialogue (διαλεχθεὶς)
(217b2-7). Phaedrus and Agathon realize that Socrates would prefer dialogue to giving a speech
(194d-e), but Alcibiades appears not to notice. For him, Socrates always gives speeches, and
Socrates’ earlier speech is not at all a departure. Surprisingly, Socrates also omits dialogue from his
speech; he claims to be persuaded (πέπεισµαι δ’ ἐγώ) by Diotima (212b); 11 and his lover gives birth to
speeches (210d4-6). But a speech addresses an entire audience and cannot be questioned: it must be
defective. Socrates’ omission of dialogue from his speech would seem, then, to reflect the defective
form of any speech, but Alcibiades’ omission of dialogue appears to reflect his own inability to
interact with Socrates. He faults Socrates’ actions, but not what Socrates says. His comparison of
Socrates’ arguments to the Silenus statues (222a)—ridiculous on the outside, containing a god
within—suggests the problem: one cannot question a god as one must question a philosophical
argument. He cannot engage Socrates because he is convinced that Socrates is right.
Alcibiades’ entry into the dialogue belongs to what is commonly regarded as the dramatic
action of the dialogue, in contrast with its arguments. We have seen, though that this dramatic action
cannot be divorced from the dialogue’s philosophical content. The drama here refutes Socrates’
7 Socrates’ assertion that Alcibiades is sober after all (222c) returns the compliment Alcibiades had paid to him (220a) and
signifies, perhaps, Socrates’ appreciation (misplaced, it turned out) of his moral character.
8 Alcibiades’ own inability to pursue philosophy undermines Michael Gargarin, “Socrates’ Hybris and Alcibiades’ Failure,”
Phoenix 31 (1977): 35–37, argument that Socrates’ hybris is to blame. Gargarin thinks that, through dramatic clues, the
dialogue presents Socrates as having achieved a knowledge of beauty that separates him from his interlocutors/lovers and
frustrates their attempts to pursue knowledge with him.
9 Or does he suppose, like Agathon at 175c-d, that proximity to Socrates will make knowledge will flow into him? Of
course, neither is a way to acquire knowledge, but they point to a central theme in the dialogue.
10. Elizabeth S. Belfiore, Socrates’ Daimonic Art: Love for Wisdom in Four Platonic Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), compares Agathon to Alcibiades. Both are beloved by Socrates and both accuse him of hubris. She
argues that Agathon does not pursue philosophy because he lacks a passionate nature (p. 184). In my view, it is more in
keeping with the dialogue to say, rather, that Agathon lacks the need of the lover, a point that emerges not only in his speech
on Eros, but also in Socrates’ pun on his name (174b). As Belfiore notes here, scholars are divided on whether Socrates or
Alcibiades is to blame for his failure. I think both sides are mistake. The dialogue blames neither. The Alcibiades I, if
authentic, confirms the brilliance of Alicibiades’ understanding of Socrates.
11 This persuasion is a mere belief that is not produced by arguments (cf. Crito 46b); Belfiore, Socrates’ Daimonic Art, 155.
She explains how Socrates’ speech is persuasive (pp. 159-60), but does not mention how uncharacteristic of Socrates this is.
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