Symposium - AIC

1. Introduction
Symposium 212a6-7: the Most Immortal of Men
Gerard Boter
As Kurt Sier writes in his monograph on Diotima’s speech, the concluding sentence of this speech is
the most discussed sentence of the Symposium. 1 There is no unanimity on the character of the
immortality which is in store for the philosopher-lover and probably there never will be. In this paper
I do not intend to bring forth a new interpretation. I wish to draw attention to two hitherto neglected
formal arguments in favour of the thesis that the philosopher’s immortality described by Diotima
refers exclusively to immortality by means of posterity and not to some sort of personal immortality
after death. Both arguments are contained in the words 212a6-7 καὶ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων
ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ.
The problem concerning the philosopher’s immortality as sketched by Diotima at the end of
her speech is well-known. Some scholars argue that the philosopher becomes immortal by
procreation, like other living beings. 2 Others maintain that this is not enough: they claim that in
addition to the immortality by procreation the philosopher also gains a higher type of
immortality―one bestowed upon him as a reward for his perfect virtue. 3 Yet others argue that
Diotima is talking exclusively about immortality after death. 4
Let us first read the passage which interests us: the end of Diotima’s speech (Smp. 211e4-
212a7).
2. ἄνθρωπος
ἆρ’ οἴει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον
(212a1) γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ δεῖ
θεωµένου καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυµῇ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα
αὐτῷ µοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν
οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτοµένῳ, ἀλλὰ
(a5) ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτοµένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν
ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαµένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ
τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;
“Do you think it’s a worthless life,” she said, “ if a person (ἄνθρωπος) turns his gaze in that
direction and contemplates that beauty with the faculty he should use, and is able to be with
it? Or do you not recognize”, she said, “that it is under these conditions alone, as he sees
beauty with what has the power to see it, that he will succeed in bringing to birth, not
phantoms of virtue, because he is not grasping a phantom, but true virtue, because he is
grasping the truth; and that when he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue, it belongs to
him to be loved by the gods, and to him, if to any human being (ἄνθρωπος), to be immortal?”
(Rowe)
Throughout Diotima’s speech it is pointed out that man is a living being, composed of body and soul.
Because one of these elements―the body―is mortal, the composite of body and soul is mortal too.
With regard to the body, man is equal to any living being. See for instance Smp. 206c1-8: “All human
beings (ἄνθρωποι), Socrates, are pregnant both in body (σῶµα) and in soul (ψυχή), and when we
come to be of the right age, we naturally desire to give birth. (...) This matter of giving birth is
something divine: living creatures (ζῴῳ), despite their mortality (θνητῷ), contain this immortal aspect
(ἀθάνατον), of pregnancy and procreation.” (Rowe) In this passage, man is called a ζῷον, “a living
1 Sier 1997, 184: “Dies ist der in der Forschung meistdiskutierte Satz des Symposion.”
2 See for instance Wippern 1965, 142 (with note 123 on p. 158); Dyson 1986, 59-72; Stokes 1986, 180-182; Price 1989, 49-
54; Rowe 1998, ad 212a6-7 (p. 201).
3 See for instance Sier 1997, 184-197; Fierro 2001, 34-36; Sedley 2009, 160-161. According to Sier the philosopher’s soul
continues to exist after death as an individual with an unchanged and unchangeable identity. Fierro suggests that the
philosopher’s fate as sketched in the Phaedo, where the philosopher “attain[s] the best kind of existence (i.e. an existence in
which the soul is by itself, lives with the gods, is in contact with the Forms and achieves an immortality which is superior to
a just survival through reincarnation)”, is also what Diotima attributes to the perfect lover of beauty. Sedley states that the
philosopher is “as it were, an intellectual Heracles”.
4 See for instance O’Brien 1984.